X 


THE    MONKOB    DOOTKINE. 


THE 


MONROE    DOCTRINE 


A   CONCISE    HISTORY 


OF   ITS 


ORIGIN    AND    GROWTH 


BY 


f^LA^A^ 


GEORGE    F.  TUCKER 
*  f 

OF   THE   BOSTON   BAR 

(AuTHOB  OF  "Manual  OF  Wills*') 


WITH 

SUPPLEMENT  TO   1905 

(  CHAPTER   XI,  **VE1NEZUELA"  ) 


BOSTON 

PUBLISHED    BY    GEORGE    B.    REED 
Law  Bookseller  and  Publisher 

1885 

Of  THt 

VNIYEHeiTY 


Copyright,  1885^      A^€  U^    ^ 
By  George  F.   Tucker. 


/ 


CONTENTS. 


Chapter  Page 
I  I.    The  Causes  which  led  to  the  Declara- 
tion OP  President  Monroe     ....  1 

^  II.    The  Declaration  itself      ......  12 

III.  The  Panama  Congress 23 

IV.  Yucatan 37 

V.  V.  The  Interoceanic  Canal  and  the  Clayton- 

Bulwer  Treaty 43 

J  VI.  Cuba 77 

VII.    The  French  Intervention  in  Mexico     .  92 

VIII.    America  North  of  the  United  States   .  108 

IX.    Minor    Occasions    on   which  the    Doc- 

'                    trine  has  been  applied      116 

X.    Conclusions 122 


Index 133 


PREFACE. 


The  design  of  the  author  is  to  present  a  con- 
cise and  impartial  history  of  a  subject  which  for 
more  than  sixty  years  has  been  of  importance 
to  the  nation  and  of  interest  to  the  people. 

He  desires  to  acknowledge  the  aid  derived 
from  the  collection  of  authorities  by  Mr.  J.  F. 
Jameson,  Ph.  D.,  in  President  Oilman's  "  Life  of 
Monroe,"  and  to  express  his  thanks  to  his  friend 
Mr.  W.  E.  Foster,  of  the  Providence  Free  Public 
Library,  for  several  timely  suggestions. 

G.  F.  T. 
Boston,  Feb.  2,  1885. 


^ 


THE   MONEOE  DOCTRINE. 


CHAPTER  I. 


THE   CAUSES   WHICH    LED   TO   THE    DECLARATION 
OF   PRESIDENT   MONROE. 

By  the  treaty  of  Nov.  30, 1782,  Great  Britain 
formally  acknowledged  the'  sovereignty  and  in- 
dependence of  the  United  States.  The  struggle 
terminate^  ^y  this  convention  left  the  American 
people  poor  in  material  possessions,  but  rich  in 
those  experiences  which,  however  trying,  are 
ever  designed  to  shape  individual  character, 
and  thus  to  contribute  to  national  prosperity. 
Pertinent  to  our  inquiry  is  the  consideration  of 
the  growth  of  a  popular  conviction  that  it  was 
impolitic  for  this  continent  to  become  a  party 
to  European  disturbances,  and  that  European 
monarchical  institutions  should  not  be  allowed 
a  foot-hold  here. 

The  growth  of  a  national  sentiment  was  slow. 
First  came   the  Confederation,  —  only  a  weak 


2  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

expression  of  a  national  idea,  but  followed  in  a 
few  years  by  that  closer  union  which  at  its  in- 
ception seemed  to  derive  a  measure  of  vigor  from 
the  directive  genius  of  Washington.    Even  then 
,     .  the  Fathers  recognized  the  advantage  of  their 
f  isolation.     A  wide  ocean  separated  them  from 
i   their  former  foe.     Now  and  then  some  foreign 
enthusiast  wrote  or  sung  of  the  coming  land 
beyond  the  sea/  or  some  advocate  of  absolutism 
deprecated  the  apparent  success  of  the  Ameri- 
can experiment;  but  the  majority  of  Europeans 
were  doubtless  indifferent  to  the  expansion  of 
the  new  Republic.     However,  there  was  an  ap- 
•     prehension  on  the  part  of  many  Americans  that 
foreign  Governments  viewed  the  growing  power 
of  the  United  States  with  disfavor  and  alarm. 
This  apprehension  occasionally  found  expression 
in  the  public  prints  and  in  the  speeches  of  pub- 
/lie  men.    The  opinion  was  prevalent  that  Amer- 
I  ica  belonged  to  Americans,  and  that  to  preserve 
our  institutions  we  must  not  become  a  party  to 
i  any  foreign  alliance.  /  Copious  quotations  might 
be  made ;  ^  but  the  declaration  of  Washington  in 
his  Farewell  Address  is  sufficient :  — 

^  See  Sumner's  Prophetic  Voices. 

2  See    Gilman's    Life    of    Monroe,   chap.   vii.     (American 
Statesmen  Series). 

\ 


■41 
k 


^ 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  DECLAKATION.     3 

"  The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard  to 
foreign  nations,  is,  in  extending  our  commercial  rela- 
tions, to  have  with  them  as  little  political  connection 
as  possible.  So  far  as  we  have  already  formed  en- 
gagements, let  them  be  fulfilled  with  perfect  good 
faith.     Here  let  us  stop. 

"  Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests,  which  to 
us  have  none,  or  a  very  remote  relation.  Hence  she 
must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies,  the  causes 
of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns. 
Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  impli- 
cate ourselves,  by  artificial  ties,  in  the  ordinary  vicis- 
situdes of  her  politics,  or  the  ordinary  combinations 
and  collisions  of  her  friendships  or  enmities. 

"  Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites  and 
enables  us  to  pursue  a  different  course.  If  we  remain 
one  people,  under  an  efiicient  Government,  the  period 
is  not  far  off  when  we  may  defy  material  injury  from 
external  annoyance  ;  when  we  may  take  such  an  atti- 
tude as  will  cause  the  neutrality  we  may  at  any  time 
resolve  upon,  to  be  scrupulously  respected ;  when 
belligerent  nations,  under  the  impossibility  of  mak- 
ing acquisitions  upon  us,  will  not  lightly  hazard 
the  giving  us  provocation ;  when  we  may  choose 
peace  or  war  as  our  interest,  guided  by  justice,  shall 
counsel. 

*'  Why  forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situa- 
tion ?  Why  quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign 
^lound?  Why,  by  interweaving  mvrjlestiqy  with 
that  of  any  part  of  Europe,  entangleour  peace-  and 


4  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

prosperity  in  the  toils  of  European  ambition,  rival- 
^hip,  interest,  humor,  or  caprice  ?  " 

Whether,  as  is  often  maintained,  the  declara- 
tion of  President  Monroe  is  the  logical  deduction 
from  this  emphatic  warning  of  Washington,  it  is 
not  our  purpose  to  inquire ;  but  certain  it  is  that 
, /'this  American  idea  of  non-intervention  in  Euro- 
pean affairs  and  of  opposing  European  interven- 
*tion  in  ours  at  last  obtained  such  a  hold  upon 
ffie  popular  mind  that  nothing  was  necessary 
1)^  an  occasion  to  call  forth  from  the  highest 
constituted  authority  its  assertion  as  a  national 
doctritie. 

"^Fhat  the  Monroe  Doctrine^  therefore,  is  some- 
thing difficult  to  understand,  as  many  seem  to 
believe,  is  far  from  the  truth.  It  is  the  enun- 
^ciation  of  a  patriotic  principle  by  a  patriotic 
President,  and  it  was  called  forth  in  the  fbllow- 
ing  way. 

The  right  of  every  European  State  to  increase 
its  "dominions  by  pacific  measures  has  been  long 
admitted.  But  there  has  been  publicly  acknowl- 
edged for  more  than  two  centuries  a  right  of 
interference  whenever  the  ambitious  designs  of 
any  of  the  great  rulers  has  tended  to_ the  d* 
turbance  of  the  proper  distribution  of  pow 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  DECLAKATION.     5 

This  doctrine  is  called  the  "  balance  of  power.'* 
It  does  not  prohibit  colonization  or  the  acquisi- 
tion of  territory  outside  the  limits  of  Europe, 
nor  does  it  include  States  beyond  those  limits,  as 
they  have  no  apparent  influence  on  European 
affairs. 

By  many  this  doctrine  has  been  lauded  as  the 
best  possible  means  of  preventing  any  disturb^'^ 
ance  of  a  necessary  ratio  of  power ;  by  others  ^ 
it  has  been  denounced  as  an  adherence   to  a  j 
barbarous  principle  and  as  a  pretext  for  unjus-  / 
tifiable   interference.     It  has  been   repeatedly 
held  up  by  John  Bright  as  the  cause  of  dis- 
honorable and  bloody  conflicts,  and  it  has  been     • 
characterized  by  Robert  Lowe  as  "  that  tradition    / 
which  has  been  the  pest  of  Europe.''  ^ 

After  this  right  had  received  full  confirmation 
by  positive  acts  of  interference,  it  was  natural 
that  a  more  extreme  claim  should  be  main- 
tained. Accordingly.^several  European  powers 
at  the  time  of  the  French  Revolution  avowed 
the  right  to  put  down  any  revolutionary  move- 
ment in  that  continent  even  when  their  aid 
was  not  invoked  by  the  established  Government. 
The  continental  powers  were  not  slow  to  make  / 
this  claim  good  by  actual  interference  in  the 

»  Speech  at  Croydon,  "  Times,"  Sept.  13,  1876. 


b  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

affairs  of  France ;  but  a  declaration  of  war  on 
the  part  of  England  was  regarded  as  hardly  jus- 
tifiable, as  she  was  indebted  to  a  revolution  for 
the  development  of  her  own  institutions.  A 
pretext,  however,  was  not  long  wanting,  and 
she  soon  became  a  participant  in  that  fearful 
contest  which  deluged  Europe  in  blood  for 
nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century. 

y  With  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  came  the  for- 
midable arrangement  known  as  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance, the  parties  to  which  were  Russia,  Austria, 
and  Prussia,  and  which  was  generally  believed 
to  be  hostile  to  popular  rights  and  to  the 
freedom  of  nations.  This  was  succeeded  in 
September,  1818,  by  the  Congress  of  Aix-la- 
ChapeHe^^tlt-which  the  five  great  Powers  parti- 
cipated ;  namely,  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Prussia, 

} Austria,  and  France.  (This  alliance  accomplished 
the  removal  of  the  army  of  occupation  from 
France,  and  it  is  said  that  some  of  the  contract- 
ing parties  at  least  expressed  extreme  views  as 
to  the  necessity  of  interference  whenever  the 
supremacy  of  absolutism  was  endangered.N  At 
the  Congress  held  at  Troppau,  in  Silesia,  October, 
1820,  which  was  removed  later  in  the  same  year 
to  Lay  bach,  in  Styria,  it  was  proposed  to  interfere 

^  in  the  affairs  of  Naples,  where  a  revolution  had 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  DECLARATION.     7 

broken  out;  but  England  resolutely  protested. 
However,  the  revolution  was  suppressed  by  Aus- 
trian arms,  and_  absolutism  was  restored.  An- 
other Congress  met  at  Verona,  in  October,  1822, 
to  consider  the  insurrection  which  broke  out  in 
Spain  in  the  middle  of  the  preceding  year. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  Spain,  the 
proudest  and  perhaps  the  most  powerful  nation 
in  Eiu-ope  in  the  days  of  Charles  V.  and  Philip 
II.,  had  now  degenerated  into  a  second-rate 
Power.  She  was  not  only  unable  to  quell  her 
own  internal  dissensions,  but  her  long-prized 
American  dependencies  were  in  open  revolt, 
and  were  slipping  from  her  grasp.  At  this 
Congress  of  Verona,  England,  through  her  en- 
voy, the  Duke  of  Wellington,  again  declined 
to  become  a  party  to  any  agreement  of  inter- 
ference. But  a  French  army,  with  the  approval 
of  the  other  Powers,  soon  after  occupied  Spain 
and  suppressed  the  insurrection. 

These  proceedings  at  Verona  hastened  the 
formal  publication  of  the  declaration  known  as 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  subject  of  helping 
Spain  to  recover  her  revolting  colonies  in  Amer- 
ica was  there  discussed,  but  the  proposal  again 
met  with  the  vigorous  opposition  of  England. 

The   commercial   supremacy   of  England   at 


8  THE   MONKOE    DOCTEINE. 

that  period  was  unquestioned,  —  a  supremacy 
which  she  was  zealous  to  maintain.  Her  trade 
with  the  South  American  colonies  was  both  con- 
siderable and  increasing,  and  it  was  natural  that 
she  should  view  with  alarm  any  intervention 
by  European  powers  which  should  result  in  the 
resubjugation  of  those  countries  to  Spain,  and 

\  consequently  in  the  readoption  by  the  latter  of 
a  restrictive  commercial  policy.  On  the  other 
hand,  to  do  her  justice,  she  was  the  most  ad- 
vanced nation  in  Europe,  and  it  was  natural 
that,  in  the  remembrance  of  her  own  constitu- 
tional development,  she  should  deprecate  Euro- 

V  pean  interference  in  American  affairs.  Besides, 
she  was  fast  moving  along  in  the  plane  of  civil 
progress.  Already  there  were  indications  that 
the  extension  of  popular  suffrage  could  not  be 
long  delayed.  Only  a  decade  was  to  elapse 
before  the  passage  of  the  Reform  Bill,  which 
was  not   many  years  after   to  be   followed  by 

\/  the  Repeal  of  the  Corn-Laws. 

While,  therefore,  she  may  have  been  some- 
what influenced  by  sympathy  with  a  struggling 
people,  her  chief  motive  was  unquestionably, 
a  selfish  one.  Her  administration  of  foreign 
affairs  at  this  period  was  in  the  hands  of  Mr. 
Canning,  who  was  not  only  eminently  fitted  by 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  DECLARATION".     9 

attainments  and  experience  to  discharge  the 
duties  of  the  position,  but  thoroughly  committed 
to  that  policy  which  should  advance  her  commer- 
cial interests.  Our  minister  at  the  Court  of  St. 
James  was  RiVhf^rd  Rnsh^  a  gentleman  of  varied 
attainments  and  great  abilities ;  while  our  Secre- 
tary of  State  was  John  Quincy  Adams^  who  had 
at  heart  not  only  the  interests  of  this  country 
and  continent,  but  from  his  experience  in  vari- 
ous diplomatic  positions  in  Europe  was  probably 
of  all  Americans  the  best  acquainted  with  the 
temper  of  European  courts,  and  thus  the  best 
fitted  to  thwart,  by  a  vigorous  policy,  their 
aggressive  intentions. 

While  the  danger  was  impending,  Mr.  Can- 
ning, in  August,  1823,  proposed  to  Mr.  Rush 
that  the  Governments  of  England  and  of  the 
United  States  should  publish  '^a  joint  declara- 
tion before  Europe,''  in  opposition  to  the  designs 
of  the  alliance  in  regard  to  this  continent ;  the 
substance  of  which  should  be,  that  while  the  two 
Governments  desired  no  portion  of  those  colonies 
for  themselves,  they  would  not  view  with  indif- 
ference any  foreign  intervention  in  their  affairs, 
or  their  acquisition  by  any  third  Power.  He  was 
most  earnest  and  persistent  in  urging  upon  our 
minister  the  necessity  of  such  a  step ;  and  he 


10  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

declared  that  a  proposal  would  be  made  for  a 
\^  European  Congress,  to  consider  the  affairs  of 
Spanish  America,  and  that  Great  Britain  would 
not  participate  in  its  counsels  unless  the  United 
States  was  also  represented.  As  to  the  Congress, 
Mr.  Rush  replied  that  it  was  the  traditional  pol- 
icy of  the  United  States  to  take  no  part  in  the 
^  politics  of  Europe  ;  and  as  to  the  declaration, 
he  remarked  that  he  was  without  instructions 
from  his  Government ;  yet  he  would  assume  the 
responsibility,  provided  England  would  comply 
i^  with  one  request.  |  The  United  States  had  already 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  Spanish- 
American  republics,  and  their  acknowledgment 
by  England  was  the  condition  precedent  upon 
the  performance  of  which  Mr.  Rush  agreed  for 
his  own  country  to  unite  in  the  "  joint  declara- 
tion." This,  Mr.  Canning  declined  to  do,  and  the 
declaration  was  never  made.  | 

Upon  the  rejection  of  his  proposal  by  Mr. 
Rush,  Mr.  Canning  felt  that  he  must  emphati- 
cally discountenance  the  apparent  designs  of  the 
Government  of  France.  Accordingly  he  boldly 
asserted  to  the  Prince  de  Polignac  that  Great 
V  Britain  would  not  permit  any  European  inter- 
vention in  Spanish- American  affairs ;  and  to  his 
great   surprise    the   Prince    disavowed   for   his 


THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  DECLARATION.    11 

Government  any  intention  so  to  interfere,  and 
acquiesced  in  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Canning  that 
the  reduction  of  the  colonies  by  Spain  was  ut- 
terly hopeless. 

Mr.  Canning's  biographer  remarks  as  follows : 

"  By  the  declarations  of  the  Prince  de  Polignac  in 
this  important  conference,  it  is  not  unfair  to  conclude 
if  the  projects  of  the  French  Cabinet  were,  as  they 
were  supposed  to  have  been,  to  have  indemnified 
France  for  the  expenses  of  the  invasion  of  Spain  by 
territorial  acquisitions  in  Spanish  America,  that  those 
projects  were  in  a  great  degree  laid  aside  in  con- 
sequence of  the  firm  and  decided  tone  taken  by 
Mr.  Canning.  But  whether  they  were  abandoned  or 
not,  the  conviction  of  the  French  Government  that 
'  it  was  utterly  hopeless  to  reduce  Spanish  America 
to  the  state  of  its  former  relations  to  Spain  '  be- 
ing avowed,  and  'the  design  of  acting  iii  any  case 
against  the  colonies  by  force  of  arms '  being  ab- 
jured, were  of  the  utmost  value  in  preparing  the  way 
for  the  ultimate  measure  of  recognition  on  which,  in 
the  event  of  their  being  gratified,  Mr.  Canning  had 
resolved."  ^ 

1  Stapleton*s  Life  of  Canning,  li.  32,  33. 


d 


12  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 


a; 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE   DECLARATION  ITSELF. 

-4-S  it  is  our  purpose  to  dwell  «hiefly  upon  the 
genesis  and  development  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, it  becomes  important  to  consider  a  few 
events  which  preceded  the  declaration  of  Presi- 
dent Monroe. 

In  the  early  days  of  this  century  the  title  to 
the  northwestern  territory  of  North  America 
was  claimed  by  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  the 
United  States.  The  settlement  of  their  differ- 
ences will  be  considered  later  on ;  ^  but  for  a 
long  time  each  pushed  its  claim  with  firmness 
and  persistency. 

In  a  communication  to  Mr.  Rush,  dated  July  2, 
1823,  in  relation  to  this  controversy,  Mr.  Adams 
made  the  following  statement.:  — 

*'  These  independent  nations  [thai  is,  those  of  South 
America  and  Mexico]  will  possess  the  rights  incident 
to  that  condition,  and  their  territories  will  of  course 

1  See  chap.  viii. 


THE   DECLARATION  ITSELF.  ^  13 

be  subject  to  no  exclusive  right  of  navigation  in  their 
vicinity,  or  of  access  to  them  by  any  foreign  nation. 
A  necessary  consequence  of  this  state  of  things  will 
be,  that  the  American  continents  henceforth  will  ncW 
longer  be  subject  to  colonization.  Occupied  by  civil- 
ize^iations,  they  will  be  accessible  to  Europeans  and 
e^^Jother  on  that  footing  alone ;  and  the  Pacific 
I,  in  every  part  of  it,  will  remain  open  to  the 
Fgation  of  all  nations  in  like  manner  with  the 
3lantic." 

A  few  days  after,  on  the  17th  of  the  same 
month,  Mr.  Adams  remarked  to  Baron  Tuyl,  in  J 
an  interview  relative  to  this  territorial  dispute, 
that  "  we  shoald^  contest  the  right  of  Russia  ^o 
a7ii/  territorial  establishment  on  this  continent,  .^ 
and  that  we  should  assume  distinctly  the  princi- 
ple that  the  American  continents  are  no  longer 
subjects  for  any  new  European  colonial  estab- 
lishments.^ ^"  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  the 
editor  of  the  Diary  from  which  this  is  taken, 
appends  a  note  to  the  effect  that  this  is  "the 
first  hint  of  the  policy  so  well  known  after- 
ward as  the  Monroe  Doctrine." 

Just  after  this  interview  between  Mr.  Adams, 
and  Baron  Tuyl  the  conversations  between  Mr. 
Rush  and  Mr.  Canning  took  place,  to  which  ref- 
erence has  been  made  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

1  Diary,  vi.  163. 


X 


14  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

A  full  account  of  Mr.  Canning's  suggestions  or 
requests,  as  well  as  his  information  of  the  atti- 
tude of  the  continental  Powers,  was  at  once 
transmitted  by  Mr.  Kush  to  Mr.  Adams,  and 
the  matter  was  brought  to  the  notice  of  the 
President.  The  latter  considered  the  situ^fcn 
so  grave  a  one  that  he  solicited  the  opii 
of  the  ex-Presidents  Madison  and  JefferJ 
Mr.  Madison  stated  that  the  circumstances 
the  case  and  our  relations  to  the  new  republics 
were  such  as  to  call  "  for  our  efforts  to  defeat 
the  meditated  crusade."^  Mr.  Jefferson  was 
even  more  explicit:  — 

"  The  question  presented  by  the  letters  you  have 
sent  me  is  the  most  momentous  which  has  ever  been 
offered  to  my  contemplation  since  that  of  Independ- 
ence. That  made  us  a  nation ;  this  sets  our  compass 
and  points  the  course  which  we  are  to  steer  through 
the  ocean  of  time  opening  on  us.  And  never  could 
we  embark  on  it  under  circumstances  more  auspi- 
cious. ^OxLr  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  he, 
never  to  entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe. 
Our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle 
with  CIS-Atlantic  affairs,  America,  North  and  South, 
has  a  set  of  interests  distinct  from  those  of  Europe, 
and  peculiarly  her  own.  She  should  therefore  have 
a  system  of  her  own,  separate  and  apart  from  that 

1  Works,  iii.  339. 


THE   DECLAKATION   ITSELF.  15 

of  Europe.  While  the  last  is  laboring  to  become  the 
domicile  of  despotism,  our  endeavor  should  surely  be 
to  make  our  hemisphere  that  of  freedom." 

The  President's  message  bears  date  Dec.  2, 
1823.  Shortly  after  its  beginning  appears  the 
following  passage :  — 

^At  the  proposal  of  the  Russian  Imperial  Govern- 
ment, made  through  the  minister  of  the  Emperor  re- 
siding here,  a  full  power  and  instructions  have  been 
transmitted  to  the  minister  of  the  United  States  at 
St.  Petersburg,  to  arrange,  by  amicable  negotiation, 
the  respective  rights  and  interests  of  the  two  nations 
on  the  northwest  coast  of  this  continent.  A  similar 
proposal  had  been  made  by  his  Imperial  Majesty  to 
the  Government  of  Great  Britain,  which  has  like- 
wise been  acceded  to.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  has  been  desirous,  by  this  friendly  proceeding, 
of  manifesting  the  great  value  which  they  have  inva- 
riably attached  to  the  friendship  of  the  Emperor,  and 
their  solicitude  to  cultivate  the  best  understanding 
with  his  Government.  In  the  discussions  to  which 
this  interest  has  given  rise,  and  in  the  arrangements 
by  which  they  may  terminate,  the  occasion  has  been 
judged  proper  for  asserting,  as  a  principle  in  which 
the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are 
involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free  (^ 
and  independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed 

1  Works,  vii.  315. 


16  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

/  and  maintained,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered 
^;  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European 
powers." 

Later  on,  just  before  the  close  of  the  message, 
the  President  says :  — 

"  It  was  stated  at  the  commencement  of  the  last 
session  that  a  great  effort  was  then  making  in  Spain 
and  Portugal  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  peo- 
ple of  those  countries,  and  that  it  appeared  to  be 
conducted  with  extraordinary  moderation.     It  need 
scarcel}^  be  remarked  that  the  result  has  been  so  far 
very  different  from  what  was  then  anticipated.     Of 
events  in  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  with  which  we 
have  so  much  intercourse,  and  from  which  we  derive 
our  origin,  jsp  have  always  been  anxious  and  inter- 
ested spectators.     The  citizens  of  the  United  States 
cherish  sentiments  the  most  friendly  in  favor  of  the 
liberty  and  happiness  of  their   fellow-men   on  that 
(  side  of  the  Atlantic.     In  the  wars  of  the  European 
\  J  powers,  in  matters  relating  to  themselves  we  have 
2\  never  taken  any  partj  nor  does  it  comport  with  our 
( policy  so  to  do.;    It  is  only  when  our  rights  are  in- 
vaded or  seriously  menaced  that  we  resent  injuries  or 
make  preparation  for  our  defence,  v  With  the  move- 
'y  { ments  in  this  hemisphere  we  are,  of  necessity,  more 
^    immediately  connected,  and  by  causes   which  must 
be  obvious  to  all  enlightened  and  impartial  observers. 
The  political  system  of  the  Allied  Powers  is  essentially 
different  in  this  respect  from  that  of  America.     This 


THE   DECLARATION   ITSELF  17 

difference  proceeds  from  that  which  exists  in  their 
respective  Governments.  And  to  the  defence  of  our 
own,  which  has  been  achieved  by  the  loss  of  so  much 
blood  and  treasure,  and  matured  by  the  wisdom  of 
their  most  enlightened  citizens,  and  under  which  we 
have  enjoyed  unexampled  felicity,  this  whole  nation 
is  devoted.  We  owe  it,  therefore^  to  candor^  and  to  the 
amicable  relations  existing  between  th&-  Umted^ States  -^' 
^nd~tJiose  Powers,  to  declare  that  we  should  consider 
any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any 
portion  of,  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and 
safety,  '^With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies 
of  any  European  power  we  have  not  interfered  and 
shall  not  interfere  ;  but  with  the  Governments  who 
have  declared  their  independence  and  maintained  it, 
and  whose  independence  we  have  on  great  consider- 
tion  and  on  just  principles  acknowledged,  we  could 
not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppress- 
ing them,  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their 
destiny,  by  any  European  power,  in  any  other  light 
than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  ^ 
toward  the  United  States.  In  the  war  between  those  N 
new  Governments  and  Spain  we  declared  our  neu- 
trality at  the  time  of  their  recognition,  and  to  this 
we  have  adhered,  and  shall  continue  to  adhere, 
provided  no  change  shall  occur  which,  in  the  judg- 
ment of  the  competent  authorities  of  this  Gov- 
ernment, shall  make  a  corresponding  change  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  indispensable  to  their 
security. 

2 


18  THE  MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

"  The  late  events  in  Spain  and  Portugal  show  that 
Europe  is  still  unsettled.  Of  this  important  fact  no 
stronger  proof  can  be  adduced  than  that  the  Allied 
Powers  should  have  thought  it  proper,  on  a  principle 
satisfactory  to  themselves,  to  have  interposed  by  force 
in  the  internal  concerns  of  Spain.  To  what  extent 
such  interposition  may  be  carried  on  the  same  prin- 
ciple is  a  question  to  which  all  independent  powers 
whose  governments  differ  from  theirs  are  interested, - 
even  those  most  remote ;  ^nd  surely  none  more  so 
than  the  United  States.  Our  policy  in  regard  to 
;  Europe,  which  was  adopted  at  an  early  stage  of  the 
'  wars  which  have  so  long  agitated  that  quarter  of 
the  globe,  nevertheless  remains  the  same,  which  is, 
not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of  its 
Powers ;  to  consider  the  government  de  facto  as  the 
legitimate  government  for  us  ;  to  cultivate  friendly 
relations  with  it,  and  to  preserve  those  relations  by 
a  frank,  firm,  and  manly  policy ;  meeting,  in  all  in- 
stances, the  just  claims  of  every  Power,  submitting 
to  injuries  from  none.  But  in  regard  to  these  conti- 
nents circumstances  are  eminently  and  conspicuously 
different.  ,^  It  is  impossible  that  the  Allied  Powers 
should  extend  their  political  system  to  any  portion 
of  either  continent  without  endangering  our  peace 
and  happiness ;  nor  can  any  one  believe  that  our 
Southern  brethren,  if  left  to  themselves,  would  adopt 
it  of  their  own  accord.  It  is  equally  impossible, 
therefore,  that  we  should  behold  such  interposition,  in 
any  form,  with  indifference.    If  we  look  to  the  com- 


THE   DECLARATION   ITSELF.  19 

parative  strength  and  resources  of  Spain  and  these 
new  Governments,  and  their  distance  from  each  other, 
it  must  be  obvious  that  she  can  never  subdue  them. 
It  is  still  the  true  policy  of  the  United  States  to 
leave  the  parties  to  themselves,  in  the  hope  that 
other  Powers  will  pursue  the  same  course." 

In  his  annual  message  of  Dec.  7,  1824,  the 
President  again  referred  to  Spanish-American 
affairs  as  follows  :  — 

"  Separated,  as  we  are,  from  Europe  by  the  great 
Atlantic  Ocean,  we  can  have  no  concern  in  the  wars 
of  the  European  Governments,  nor  in  the  causes 
which  produce  them.J  The  balance  of  power  between 
them,  into  whichever  scale  it  may  .turn  in  its  various 
vibrations,  cannot  affect  us.  |lt  is  the  interest  of  the 
United  States  to  preserve  the  most  friendly  relations 
with  every  Power,  and  on  conditions  fair,  equal,  and 
applicable  to  all./  But  in  regard  to  our  neighbors 
our  situation  is  different.  It  is  impossible  for  the 
European  Governments  to  interfere  in  their  concerns, 
especially  in  those  alluded  to  which  are  vital,  without 
affecting  us  ;  indeed,  the  motive  which  might  induce 
such  interference  in  the  present  state  of  the  war  be- 
tween the  parties,  if  a  war  it  may  be  called,  would 
appear  to  be  equally  applicable  to  us.  It  is  gratify- 
ing to  know  that  some  of  the  Powers  with  whom  we 
enjoy  a  very  friendly  intercourse,  and  to  whom  these 
views  have  been  communicated,  have  appeared  to 
acquiesce  in  them." 


20  THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

While  the  President  emphatically  declares 
the  policy  of  this  country  in  regard  to  Europe 
to  be  "  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  con- 
cerns of  any  of  its  Powers/'  we  must  espe- 
cially note  and  continually  bear  in  mind  during 
the  remainder  of  this  history  that  the  sub- 
stance of  the  declaration  is  contained  in  three 
inhibitions :  — 

1.  No  more  European  colonies  on  these  continents, 

2.  No  extension  of  the  European  political  system 
to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere, 

3.  No  European  interposition  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Spanish' American  republics. 

In  the  reference  to  colonization  the  British 
nation  did  not  seem  to  concur;  but  according 
to  Mr.  Rush/ that  part  of  the  declaration  which 
dealt  with  European  intervention  was  hailed  by 
the  entire  English  people  with  joy  and  exulta- 
tion ;  and  in  the  British  Parliament  it  was  the 
subject  of  extravagant  encomiums  from  such 
men  as  Mr.  Brougham,  Sir  James  Mackintosh, 
and  Lord  John  Russell.  The  Spanish- American 
deputies  in  London  were  transported  with  joy, 
and  Spanish-American  securities  at  once  rose 
in  value  ;  the  allies  soon  abandoned  their  hos- 
tile intentions,  and  intervention  proved  to  be 
nothing  more  than  a  mere  purpose  or  threat. 


THE   DECLAEATION   ITSELF.  21 

On  the  20th  of  January,  1824,  Henry  Clay, 
then  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
moved  the  following  resolution  in  committee  of 
the  whole  on  the  state  of  the  Union :  — 

"  Resolved^  hy  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  of  America^  in  Congress 
assembled^  That  the  people  of  these  States  would  not 
see,  without  serious  inquietude,  any  forcible  inter- 
vention by  the  Allied  Powers  of  Europe,  in  behalf j 
of  Spain,  to  reduce  to  their  former  subjection  those? 
parts  of  the  continent  of  America  which  have  pro- 
claimed and  established  for  themselves,  respectively, 
independent  governments,  and  which  have  been  sol- 
emnly recognized  by  the  United  States." 

This  resolution  was  never  caUed-rrpT^nd  one 

of  like  tenor  offered  by  Mr.  Poinsett,  of  South 

'     Carolina,  met  with  a  similar  fatec 

^    Thus  very  soon  after  its  announcement  the 

Monroe  Doctrine   failed  to  receive   legislative 

confirmation. 

It  becomes  important  before  dismissing  this 
subject  to  refer  to  the  part  presumably  taken 
by  Mr,  Adams  in  the  preparation  of  those  por- 
tions of  the  message  we  have  already  quoted. 
There  has  recently  come  to  light  the  following 
extract  ^  from  the  diary  of  William  Plumer,  who 

1  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  vi.  358. 


f 


22  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

was   a  member  of  Congress  during  Monroe's 
administration :  — 

"  I  have  strong  reason  to  believe  that  this  part  of 
the  message  [that  is,  that  relating  to  foreign  affairs] 
bears  the  direct  impress  of  Mr.  Adams's  genius.  The 
ground  assumed  and  the  doctrines  inculcated  are 
certainly  his,  and  if  he  did  not  write  that  part  of  the 
message  (as  the  minister  writes  the  king's  speeches 
in  England),  I  have  little  doubt  that  he  submitted 
to  the  President  in  writing  his  views  of  what  the 
message  ought  to  contain  so  far  as  his  department 
was  concerned,  and  that  the  President,  in  preparing 
his  message,  followed  very  closely  not  only  the  views 
but  the  language  of  the  Secretary.  Adams  told  me 
that  the  President  had  doubts  about  that  part  of 
it  which  related  to  the  interference  of  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance with  Spanish  America ;  said  he  believed  it  had 
better  be  omitted,  and  asked  him  if  he  did  not  think 
so  too  ? 

"  Adams  replied,  '  You  have  my  sentiments  on 
the  subject  already,  and  I  see  no  reason  to  alter 
them.*  '  Well,'  said  the  President,  '  it  is  written, 
and  I  will  not  change  it  now.'  This  was  a  day  or 
two  only  before  Congress  met.'* 


THE   PANAMA   CONGRESS.  23 


4 


CHAPTEE  m. 

THE   PANAMA   CONGRESS. 

The  quotation  from  the  diary  of  Mr.  Plumer 
which  concludes  the  preceding  chapter  confirms 
the  opinion  generally  entertained,  that  Mr. 
Adams  did  something  more  than  merely  contrib- 
ute to  those  passages  of  the  President's  message 
which  refer  to  the  threatened  intervention  of 
European  powers.  Mr.  Adams's  fervid  patriot- 
ism was  doubtless  quickened  by  an  apprehen- 
sion, amounting  almost  to  a  conviction,  that  the 
adherents  of  absolutism  in  Europe  were  deter- 
mined to  let  no  opportunity  slip  to  impede  in 
some  way  the  progress  of  democratic  institutions 
on  this  continent.  His  continuance  in  public 
office,  therefore,  was  a  guaranty  of  the  continu- 
ance of  his  foreign  policy ;  and  very  soon  after 
his  accession  to  the  Presidency  as  the  successor 
of  Mr.  Monroe  an  opportunity  to  continue  that 
policy  was  presented,  in  the  invitation  of  several 
of  the  South  American  republics  to  the  Govern- 


24  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

ment  of  this  country  to  participate  in  tlie  de- 
liberations of  the  Congress  of  American  States 
to  be  held  at  Panama. 

These  South  American  republics  were  now 
rejoicing  in  the  assurance  of  their  own  auton- 
omy. It  was  in  1808,  nearly  twenty  years 
before,  that  the  interference  of  Napoleon  in  the 
affairs  of  Spain  enabled  them  to  sever  their 
connection  with  the  mother  country  and  to 
assert  their  independence.  Even  then  a  long 
struggle  was  inevitable.  In  vain  they  looked 
to  the  monarchies  of  Europe  for  succor  or  ap- 
proval; their  only  hope  of  recognition  was  in 
the  Government  of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Clay 
became  particularly  prominent  in  the  espousal 
of  their  cause.  Early  in  the  year  1818  he  made 
Sb  passionate  appeal  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives for  immediate  recognition;  and  it  seems 
that  the  condition  of  those  provinces  was,  on 
May  13,  1818,  one  of  the  subjects  of  discussion 
at  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet.^  Recognition  of  the 
new  republics  by  this  country  was  delayed  for 
four  years  longer,  and  it  was  followed  not  very 
long  after  by  their  acknowledgment  by  Great 
Britain.  The  inference  therefore  is  natural,  that 
upon  his  acceptance  of  the  office  of  Secretary 

*  See  Works  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  iv.  91. 


THE   PANAMA   CONGRESS,  25 

of  State  under  President  Adams,  Mr.  Clay  was 
as  ready  to  join  in  any  effort  to  extend  help  to 
the  new  republics  as  he  had  been  to  champion 
their  cause  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Spain  had  not  yet  given  up  all  hope  of  re- 
subjugating  her  former  dependencies ;  but  co- 
ercion without  the  aid  of  some  other  European 
power  was  practically  an  impossibility.  Their 
sovereignty  and  independence  thus  acknowl- 
edged by  the  two  great  English-speaking  na- 
tions, the  young  republics  began  to  agitate  the 
calling  of  a  Congress  at  Panama,  to  which  the 
Governments  of  the  American  States  (includ- 
ing the  Government  of  this  country)  should 
be  invited  to  send  representatives  to  discuss 
questions  and  adopt  measures  particularly  affect- 
ing the  welfare  and  development  of  the  Ameri- 
can continents. 

Here  it  should  be  noted  that  Mr.  Clay,  in  his 
instructions  of  March  25,  1825,  to  Mr.  Poinsett, 
Minister  of  the  United  States  to  Mexico,  directed 
him  to  urge  upon  the  Government  of  that  coun- 
try the  utility  and  expediency  of  asserting  the 
principles  laid  down  in  the  message  of  Presi- 
dent Monroe  of  Dec.  2,  1823.  In  regard  to 
the  principle  that  the  American  continents  are 
not  henceforth  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for 


^7»R  A^  y 
^   Of  THI 


VNIY£PI61TY 


Of 


V 


26  THE   MONROE   DOCTRIN"E. 

future  colonization  by  any  European  power, 
Mr.  Clay  remarked:  "There  is  no  disposition 
to  disturb  the  colonial  possessions,  as  they  may 
now  exist,  of  any  of  the  European  powers ;  but 
it  is  against  the  establishment  of  new  European 
colonies  upon  this  continent  that  the  principle 
is  directed."^ 

At  about  the  time  when  these  instructions 
were  given  to  Mr.  Poinsett,  Mr.  Clay  informed 
the  ministers  of  Colombia  and  Mexico,  Messrs. 
Salazar  and  Obregon,  that  the  President  thought 
that  the  United  States  ought  to  be  represented 
at  Panama  if  preliminary  points  could  be  satis- 
factorily arranged ;  "  such  as  the  subjects  to 
which  the  attention  of  the  Congress  was  to  be 
directed,  the  nature  and  the  form  of  the  powers 
to  be  given  to  the  diplomatic  agents  who  were 
to  compose  it,  and  the  mode  of  its  organization 
and  its  action."  ^ 

Messrs.  Salazar  and  Obregon,  on  the  2d  and 
3d  of  the  following  November  respectively, 
addressed  communications  to  the  Secretary  of 
State,  defining  in  a  general  way  the  probable 
subjects  of  discussion  at  the  Congress.  Mr.  Clay 
replied  on  the  30th  of  the  same  month  that 

1  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1825,  1826,  p.  487. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  457. 


THE   PANAMA   CONGRESS.  27 

there-was^  not  a  jsatisfactory  compliance  with 
the  President's  desire  as  to  the  arrangement 
of  preliminary  points;  yet  the  President  had 
decided  to  send  commissioners,  provided  the 
Senate  should  give  their  advice  and  consent* 
The  same  intention  was  also  on  the  same  day 
communicated  to  Mr.  Canaz,  the  representa- 
tive of  the  Government  of  Central  America. 

Only  a  few  days  after,  on  the  6th  of  Decem- 
ber, appeared  the  President's  message,  in  which 
he  announced  the  acceptance  of  the  invitation 
of  the  republics  of  Colombia,  of  Mexico,  and  of 
Central  America  to  the  United  States  to  take  part 
in  the  deliberations  of  the  Congress  at  Panama. 

On  the  26th  of  the  same  month  the  President 
sent  a  special  message  to  the  Senate,  in  which 
he  stated  his  motives  for  acceding  to  the  meas- 
ure and  also  the  probable  subjects  of  discussion  at 
Panama.  He  concluded  by  nominating  Richard 
C.  Anderson,  of  Kentucky,  and  John  Sergeant, 
of  Pennsylvania,  to  be  Envoys  Extraordinary 
and  Ministers  Plenipotentiary.  The  following 
passage  from  the  message  particularly  refers  to 
our  subject  of  inquiry :  — 

"  An  agreement  between  all  the  parties  repre- 
sented at  the  meeting,  that  each  will  guard,  by  its 
own  means,  against  the  establishment  of  any  future 


y 


28  THE   MONEOE   DOCTEINE. 

European  colony  within  its  borders,  may  be  found 
advisable.  This  was  more  than  two  years  since 
announced  by  my  predecessor  to  the  world  as  a 
principle  resulting  from  the  emancipatiorL.iif_both 
^  the  American  continents.  It  may  be  so  developed 
to  the  new  southern  nations  that  they  will  all  feel  it 
as  an  essential  appendage  to  their  independence."  ^ 

>^  On  March  15,  1826,  the  President  submitted 
a  message  to  the  House  of  Representatives  in 
which,  after  referring  to  that  portion  of  President 
Monroe's  message  deprecating  future  European 
colonization,  he  remarked  as  follows  :  — 

"  The  principle  had  first  been  assumed  in  the  ne- 
gotiation with  Russia.  It  rested  upon  a  course  of 
reasoning  equally  simple  and  conclusive.  With  the 
exception  of  the  existing  European  colonies,  which 
it  was  in  no  wise  intended  to  disturb,  the  two  con- 
tinents consisted  of  several  sovereign  and  independ- 
ent nations,  whose  territories  covered  their  whole 
surface.  By  this  their  independent  condition  the 
United  States  enjoyed  the  right  of  commercial  in- 
tercourse with  every  part  of  their  possessions.  To 
attempt  the  establishment  of  a  colony  in  those  pos- 
sessions would  be  to  usurp,  to  the  exclusion  of  others, 
a  commercial  intercourse  which  was  the  common  pos- 
session of  all.  It  could  not  be  done  without  encroach- 
ing upon  existing  rights  of  the  United  States.  The 
Government  of  Russia  has  never  disputed  these  posi- 
1  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1825, 1826,  p.  391. 


THE   PANAMA   CONGRESS.  29 

tions,  nor  manifested  the  slightest  dissatisfaction  at 
their  having  been  taken.  Most  of  the  new  American 
republics  have  declared  their  assent  to  them ;  and 
they  now  propose,  among  the  subjects  of  consultation 
at  Panama,  to  take  into  consideration  the  means  of 
faking-  effectual  the- assertion  of  that  principle,  as 
well  as  the  means  of  resisting  interference,  from 
abroad,  with  the  domestic  concerns  of  the  American 
Governments. 

*'  In  alluding  to  these  means  it  would  obviously 
be  premature  at  this  time  to  anticipate  that  which  is 
offered  merely  as  matter  for  consultation,  or  to  pro- 
nounce upon  those  measures  which  have  been  or  may 
be  suggested.  The  purpose  of  this  Government  is 
to  concur  in  none  which  would  import  hostility  to 
Europe,  or  justly  excite  resentment  in  any  of  her 
States.  Should  it  be  deemed  advisable  to  contract 
any  conventional  engagement  on  this  topic,  our  views 
would  extend  no  further  than  to  a  mutual  pledge  of 
the  parties  to  the  compact,  f^o  maintain  the  principle 
in  application  to  its  own  territory^  and  to  permit  no 
colonial  lodgments  or  establishment  of  European  juris- 
diction upon  its  own  soil ;  I  and  with  respect  to  the 
obtrusive  interference  from  abroad,  if  its  future  char- 
acter may  be  inferred  from  that  which  has  been,  and 
perhaps  still  is,  exercised  in  more  than  one  of  the 
new  States,  a  joint  declaration  of  its  character,  and 
exposure  of  it  to  the  world,  may  be  probably  all  that 
the  occasTon  would  require."  ^ 

1  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1825,  1826,  p.  450. 


30  THE   MONROE   DOCTRIKE. 

Later  on,  the  President  considers  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  acceptance  of  the  invitation 
might  not  have  a  tendency  to  change  the  pol- 
icy, advocated  by  Washington,  of  avoiding  for- 
eign alliances.^  He  argues  that  the  counsel  of 
Washington  "was  founded  upon  the  circum- 
stances in  which  our  country  and  the  world 
around  us  were  situated  at  the  time  when  it 
was  given;"  that  Europe  has  still  her  set  of 
primary  interests,  and  that  our  distant  and  de- 
tached situation  remains  the  same ;  but  that 
the  Spanish- American  colonies  have  now  been 
transformed  into  eighty  independent  nations  with 
reference  to  whom  our  situation  is  neither  dis- 
tant nor  detached.  Our  territorial  expansion 
and  national  development  in  the  interval  have 
been  such  that  America  has  now  "  a  set  of 
primary  interests  which  have  none,  or  a  re- 
mote relation  to  Europe." 

The  President  therefore  concludes  that  the 
acceptance  of  the  invitation,  "  far  from  conflict- 
ing with  the  counsel  or  the  policy  of  Washing- 
ton, is  directly  deducible  from  and  conformable 
to  it ; "  and  that  it  was  no  less  conformable  to 
the  declaration  of  President  Monroe  that  the 
extension  of  the  European  political  system  to 

^  See  page  3. 


THE   PANAMA   CONGRESS.  31 

any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  would  be  re- 
garded as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.^ 
After  quoting  this  particular  declaration  Mr. 
Adams  proceeds  as  follows  :  — 

"To  the  question  which  may  be  asked,  whether  this 
meeting,  and  the  principles  which  may  be  adjusted 
and  settled  by  it,  as  rules  of  intercourse  between  the 
American  nations,  may  not  give  umbrae  to  the  Holy 
League  of  European  powers,  or  offence  to  Spain,  it  is 
deemed  a  sufficient  answer,  that  our  attendance  at 
Panama  can  give  no  just  cause  of  umbrage  or  offence 
to  either;  and  that  the  United  States- willatipulate 
Bothing  there  which  can  give  such  cause.  Here  the 
right  of  inquiry  into  our  purposes  and  measures  must 
stop.  The  Holy  League  of  Europe  itself  was  formed, 
without  inquiring  of  the  United  States  whether  it 
would  or  would  not  give  umbrage  to  them.  The 
fear  of  giving  umbrage  to  the  Holy  League  of  Europe 
was  urged  as  a  motive  for  denying  to  the  American 
nations  the  acknowledgment  of  their  independence. 
That  it  would  be  viewed  by  Spain  as  hostility  to  her, 
was  not  only  urged,  but  directly  declared  by  herself. 
The  congress  and  administration  of  that  day  con- 
sulted their  rights  and  duties,  and  not  their  fears. 
Fully  determined  to  give  no  needless  displeasure  to 
any  foreign  Power,  the  United  States  can  estimate  the 
probability  of  their  giving  it,  only  by  the  right  which 
any  foreign  State  could  have  to  take  it,  from  their 
1  British  Foreign  and  State  Papers,  1825,  1826,  p.  453. 


32  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

measures.  Neither  the  representation  of  the  United 
States  at  Panama,  nor  any  measure  to  which  their 
assent  may  be  yielded  there,  will  give  to  the  Holy 
League,  or  any  of  its  members,  nor  to  Spain,  the  right 
to  take  ofPence.  For  the  rest,  the  United  States  must 
still,  as  heretofore,  take  counsel  from  their  duties 
rather  than  their  fears." 

The  debate  in  the  Senate  upon  the  proposed 
mission  was  extremely  acrimonious.  /  Serious 
charges  were  brought  against  the  President,  and 
the  policy  and  purposes  of  the  administration 
were  denounced  as  of  a  dangerous  character. 
It  was  claimed  that  a  participation  in  the  de- 
liberations of  the  Congress  could  be  of  no  ben- 
efit to  this  country,  and  might  be  the  means 
of  involving  us  in  international  complications.! 
However,  the  Senate  at  last  concurred  in  the 
appointment  of  Messrs.  Anderson  and  Ser- 
geant as  Envoys  Extraordinary  and  Ministers 
Plenipotentiary. 

The  concurrence  of  the  House  was  required 
in  order  to  afford  the  appropriation  necessary  to 
carry  the  Executive  measure  into  effect.  Dan- 
iel Webster  was  then  a  member  of  that  body, 
and  in  April,  1826,  in  committee  of  the  whole, 
he  delivered  a  remarkably  able  speech  upon 
the  duty  of  the  House.     It  was  not  their  duty 


THE   PANAMA   C0:N"GRESS.  33 

constitutionally  to  decide,  he  said,  "  what  shall 
be  discussed  by  particular  ministers,  already  ap- 
pointed, when  they  shall  meet  the  ministers  of 
the  other  Powers,"  but  simply  to  vote  the  neces- 
sary appropriation.  The  matter  would  thus  be 
left,  where  the  Constitution  had  left  it,  —  "  to 
Executive  discretion  and  Executive  responsi- 
bility." After  reviewing  the  events  which 
preceded  the  declaration  of  Mr.  Monroe,  he 
declared  :  — 

"  I  look  on  the  message  of  December,  1823,  as 
forming  a  bright  page  in  our  history.  I  will  neither 
help  to  erase  it  or  tear  it  out ;  nor  shall  it  be  by  any  , 
act  of  mine  blurred  or  blotted.  It  did  honor  to  the  y 
sagacity  of  the  Government,  and  I  will  not  diminish 
that  honor.  It  elevated  the  hopes  and  gratified  the 
patriotism  of  the  people.  Over  those  hopes  I  will 
not  bring  a  mildew ;  nor  will  I  put  that  gratified 
patriotism  to  shame."  ^ 

The  statement  by  Mr.  Adams  in  regard  to 
the  parties  to  be  represented  at  the  conference 
that "  each  will  guard,  by  its  own  means,  against 
the  establishment  of  any  future  European  colony 
within  its  borders  "  ^  has  been  often  criticised, 
and  sometimes  denounced  as  a  limitation  of  the 
inhibition  by  Mr.  Monroe  of  European  coloniza- 

1  Works,  iii.  205.  «  See  page  27. 


34  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

tion.  Mr.  Dana  maintains  that  on  the  assump- 
tion "  that  a  sovereign  State  would  not  permit 
other  sovereign  States  to  appropriate  its  terri- 
tory by  colonization/'  Mr.  Monroe  simply  de- 
clared "  ihe  fady  that  the  whole  continent  was 
within  the  territory  of  some  responsible  State, 
and  not  ferce  naturce,  and  so  open  to  appropria- 
tion ; "  and  therefore  that  the  proper  view  of 
Mr.  Adams's  proposal  is  "  that  each  State  repre- 
sented at  the  Congress  should  make  for  itself 
the  declaration  which  Mr.  Monroe  made  for  the 
United  States  in  1823,  —  that  is,  that  its  territo- 
ries were  not  open  to  appropriation  by  coloniza- 
tion, —  and  pledge  itself  to  resist  any  attempts 
in  that  direction."  ^ 

It  is  proper  to  remark  that  Mr.  Adams's  ad- 
ministration was  not  a  popular  one,  and  it  is 
therefore  probable  that  much  of  the  opposition 
to  the  mission  was  inspired  by  personal  feelings 
and  partisan  motives.  Few  measures  in  the 
history  of  the  country  have  excited  more  in- 
temperate discussion,  or  created  greater  antago- 
nism between  a  President  and  Senate. 

Messrs.  Anderson  and  Sergeant,  provided  with 
elaborate  instructions  from  Mr.  Clay,  at  last  set 

1  Wheaton,  edited  by  Dana,  §  67  n. 


THE   PANAMA   CONGRESS.  35 

out  to  attend  the  meeting  at  Panama ;  but  be- 
fore their  arrival  that  Congress  had  assembled, 
discussed  the  three  considerations  of  independence, 
peace,  and  security,  and  adjourned.  On  March  3, 
1829,  nearly  three  years  after,  the  President,  in 
laying  before  the  Senate  a  copy  of  Mr.  Clay's 
instructions  to  the  deputies,  said,  that  while 
there  was  no  probability  of  the  renewal  of  nego- 
tiations, |^Hhe  purpose[s]  for  which  they  were 
intended  are  still  of  the  deepest  interest  to  our 
country  and  to  the  world,  and  may  hereafter 
call  again  for  the  active  energies  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States."  ^| 

If  this  statement  may  be  regarded  as  a  proph- 
ecy, then  the  recent  action  of  the  United  States 
Congress  in  making  an  appropriation  for  send- 
ing three  commissioners  to  the  countries  south 
of  us  may  be  regarded  as  its  fulfilment.  Just 
before  the  late  President  Garfield  was  shot  he 
made  the  resolution,  which  was  carried  out  by 
his  successor,  of  issuing  invitations  to  all  the 
independent  Governments  of  North  and  South 
America  to  meet  in  a  Peace  Congress  at  Wash- 
ington. These  invitations  were  afterward  re- 
called or  suspended,  in  order  that  Congress 
might  give  an  opinion  upon  the  expediency  of 

^  Benton's  Abridgment,  x.  252. 


36  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

the  step ;  and  on  the  7th  of  July,  1884,  an  act 
was  approved  making  the  appropriation  referred 
to  above,  and  providing  that  "said  commissioners 
shall  ascertain  the  best  modes  of  securing  more 
intimate  international  and  commercial  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  the  several  coun- 
tries of  Central  and  South  America,  and  for  that 
purpose  they  shall  visit  such  countries  in  Cen- 
tral and  South  America  as  the  President  may 
direct."  ^ 

1  U.  S.  statutes,  1883-1884,  chap.  333,  p.  235. 


YUCATAN.  37 


CHAPTER  IV. 

YUCATANT. 

In  his  annual  message  of  Dec.  2, 1845,  Presi- 
dent Polk,  in  reiterating  the  doctrine  of  Mr. 
Monroe,  and  expressing  his  "cordial  concur- 
rence in  its  wisdom  and  sound  policy,"  added 
that  the  "existing  rights  of  every  European 
nation  should  be  respected ;  but  it  is  due  alike 
to  our  safety  and  our  interests  that  the  efficient 
protection  of  our  laws  should  be  extended  over 
our  whole  territorial  limits,  and  that  it  should 
be  distinctly  announced  to  the  world  as  our 
settled  policy,  that  no  future  European  colony 
or  dominion  shall,  with  our  consent,  be  planted 
or  established  on  any  part  of  the  North  Ameri- 
can continent."  ^ 

These  remarks  were  made  as  the  conclusion 
to  a  long  statement  relative  to  the  differences 
subsisting  between  the  Governments  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  as  to  the  disputed 
territory  in   the  northwest.^     On  the    14th  of 

^  Congressional  Globe,  29th  Congress,  1st  session. 
*  See  chap.  viii. 


38  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

the  following  month  leave  was  asked  in  the 
Senate  to  introduce  a  joint  resolution  practi- 
cally embracing  the  principle  announced  in  the 
President's  message.  In  resisting  its  introduc- 
tion, Mr.  Calhoun  expressed  views  which  a  little 
over  two  years  later  were  more  forcibly  and 
elaborately  expressed  in  the  debate  in  the  same 
body  upon  the  bill  to  enable  the  President  to 
take  military  occupation  of  Yucatan. 

On  April  29,  1848,  the  President  in  a  special 
message  called  the  attention  of  Congress  to  the 
fact  that  the  w^hite  population  of  Yucatan  had 
called  upon  the  United  States  for  help  against 
the  Indians,  who  were  waging  against  them  a 
war  of  extermination  ;  offering,  if  aid  should  be 
granted,  to  transfer  the  "  dominion  and  sover- 
eignty "  of  the  peninsula  to  the  United  States, 
and  stating  that  similar  appeals  had  been  made 
"  to  the  Spanish  and  the  English  Governments." 
He  further  stated  that  while  it  was  not  his  pur- 
pose to  recommend  a  policy  of  acquisition,  yet 
the  situation  of  the  peninsula  of  Yucatan  was 
such  as  to  render  its  transfer  to  any  European 
power  an  element  of  danger  to  our  peace  and 
security ;  and  he  declared  that  he  had  authentic 
information,  that  if  the  aid  was  not  granted  by 
the  United  States,  it  would  probably  be  obtained 


YUCATAN.  39 

from  some  European  power  likely  hereafter  to 
assert  a  claim  to  "  dominion  and  sovereignty  " 
over  Yucatan. 

The  United  States  was  at  that  time  at  war 
with  Mexico ;  and  the  President  admitted  that 
Yucatan  had  never  declared  her  independence, 
but  was  treated  by  this  country  as  a  State  of 
the  Mexican  Kepublic.^ 

A  bill  to  enable  the  President  to  take  tem- 
porary military  occupation  of  Yucatan  was  im- 
mediately introduced  in  the  Senate.  In  the 
discussion  which  followed,  Mr.  Calhoun  took  an 
active  part,  and  as  his  speech  is  a  limitation,  if 
not  a  denial,  of  the  principles  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  generally  understood,  it  deserves 
an  extended  notice. 

Mr.  Calhoun  made  the  following  points  :  — 

1.  The  declaration  of  Mr.  Monroe  that  the  ex- 
tension of  the  European  political  system  to  this 
country  would  be  regarded  as  dangerous  to 
our  peace  and  safety  referred  only  to  the  Allied 
Powers;  and  the  events  which  called  it  forth 
have  passed  away  forever. 

2.  The  declaration  of  Mr.  Monroe  that  Euro- 
pean interposition  in  the  affairs  of  the  new 
Spanish- American  republics  would  be  regarded 

^  Congressional  Globe,  30th  Congress,  1st  session. 


40  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

as  manifesting  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward 
the  United  States,  also  belongs  to  the  history  of 
that  day.  But  suppose  this  not  to  be  the  case, 
there  is  no  evidence  of  any  interposition  in  the 
affairs  of  Yucatan  on  the  part  of  England  or  any 
other  European  power  with  the  design  of  op- 
pressing her  or  changing  her  destiny.  Should 
England  interpose,  it  will  not  be  as  a  hostile 
Power,  but  at  the  solicitation  of  Yucatan ;  and 
if  she  should  assert  her  sovereignty,  it  would 
not  bring  the  case  within  the  declaration,  be- 
cause it  would  not  be  an  interposition  to  change 
the  government  and  oppress  the  country, 

3.  President  Polk  plainly  rests  his  recommen- 
dation upon  the  declaration  of  Mr.  Monroe  that 
the  continents  of  America  are  not  henceforth  to 
be  considered  as  subjects  of  colonization  by  any 
European  power.  "Colonization"  means  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  settlement  by  emigrants  from 
the  parent  country ;  this  is  the  case  of  "  sur- 
rendered sovereignty"  over  a  people  already 
there.  Yucatan  would  thus  become  a  province 
or  a  "  possession  "  of  Great  Britain,  but  not  a 
colony. 

Mr.  Calhoun  then  states  his  impression  that 
this  portion  of  the  message  originated  with  Mr. 
Adams,  and  never  became  a  subject  of  delib- 


YUCATAN.  41 

eration  in  Mr.  Monroe's  cabinet.^  It  was  in- 
accurate in  stating  that  these  continents  have 
asserted  and  maintained  their  freedom,  because 
as  a  whole  such  was  not  the  case ;  and  it  was 
improper  when  viewed  in  conjunction  with  the 
declaration  which  preceded  it,  because  we  were 
acting  in  concert  with  England  on  a  proposition 
coming  from  herself,  and  hence  the  declaration 
should  have  been  in  accordance  with  British 
feeling.  As  it  was,  it  so  offended  her  that  she 
refused  to  co-operate  with  us  in  settling  the 
Russian  question. 

Mr.  Calhoun  remarks  that  in  stating  the  ori- 
gin and  character  of  these  declarations  he  has 
discharged  a  duty  to  his  country  and,  to  use 
his  own  language,  "  a  duty  to  the  cabinet  of 
which  I  was  a  member,  and  am  now  the  only 
survivor." 

4.  The  declarations  of  Mr.  Monroe  contain 
no  reference  to  resistance. 

5.  The  principle  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of 
President  Polk's  recommendation  goes  danger- 
ously beyond  Mr.  Monroe's  declaration.  It  puts 
it  in  the  power  of  other  countries  on  this  conti- 
tinent  to  make  us  a  party  to  all  their  wars. 

6.  Resistance  to  interposition,  however,  may 

*  See  Mr.  Plumer's  statement,  p.  22. 


42  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

sometimes  be  necessary  ;  but  each  case  must  be 
decided  on  its  own  merits.  Interposition  ought 
not  to  be  allowed,  for  example,  in  the  case  of 
Cuba  and  of  Texas ;  but  Yucatan  is  a  worth- 
less country,  and  its  possession  would  contribute 
nothing  to  the  defence  of  the  passage  between 
it  and  Cuba.  Besides,  its  military  occupation 
would  impose  upon  us  a  very  heavy  cost  of 
both  men  and  money,  and  probably  bring  us 
into  conflict  with  England,  and  perhaps  Spain 
also.  Military  possession  would  likewise  be  a 
breach  of  good  faith  with  Mexico,  with  which 
country  we  have  agreed  upon  the  terms  of  a 
treaty. 

7.  Our  only  duty  is  to  do  for  the  white  popu- 
lation of  Yucatan  all  that  humanity  requires.-^ 

The  discussion  soon  ended,  as  news  was  re- 
ceived from  Yucatan  that  the  whites  and  Indians 
had  settled  their  differences  by  treaty. 

^  Works,  iv.  p.  454. 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      43 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  INTEROCEANIC  CANAL  AND  THE  CLAYTON- 
BULWER  TREATY. 

The  main  object  of  the  early  navigators  of 
the  Atlantic  Ocean  was  the  discovery  of  a  more 
direct  route  to  the  East  Indies.  When  Colum- 
bus first  reached  this  continent  he  fondly  be- 
lieved that  the  dream  of  his  life  would  be 
realized  ;  and  it  was  many  years  before  a  more 
accurate  knowledge  of  this  hemisphere  forced 
the  early  explorers  to  abandon  the  long-cher- 
ished hope.  Then  the  feasibility  of  severing 
the  Isthmus  by  a  canal,  or  of  establishing  some 
kind  of  communication  across  it,  was  suggested  ; 
and  it  is  a  fact  that  within  the  last  three  centu- 
ries and  a  half  over  forty  projects  have  been 
advocated  or  entertained  looking  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  some  l^ind  of  easy  and  permanent^ 
transit^ither  across  the  Isthmus  or  the  Central 
American  Continent.^ 

1  See  The  Liternational  Canal  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
1880,  p.  115. 


•     44  THE  MONKOE   DOCTRINE. 

\.        So  early  as  1825  attention  in  this  country 
was  directed  to  the  subject ;  and  ten  years  later, 

^on  March  3^  1835,  a  resolution  was  adopted  by 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States  requesting  the 
President  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the 
Governments  of  other  nations,  and  particularly 
with  those  of  Central  America  and  New  Gra- 
nada, for  the  purpose  of  protecting  those  who 
might  attempt  the  opening  of  communication, 
and  of  securing  the  free  navigation  thereof. 
On  Dec.  12,  1846,  a  treaty  between  this  Gov- 
ernment and  that  of  New  Granada  (now  the 
United  States  of  Colombia)  was  signed,  by  Arti- 
cle XXXV.  of  which  the  Government  of  New 
Granada  guaranteed  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  "  the  right  of  way  or  transit  across 
the  Isthmus  of  Panama  upon  any  modes  of  com- 
munication that  now  exist,  or  that  may  be  here- 
after constructed ; "  and  the  United  States  on 
its  part  guaranteed  to  the  Government  of  New 
Granada  the  perfect  neutrality  of  the  Isthmus, 
and  the  rights  of  sovereignty  and  property  of 
New  Granada  over  the  territory  of  the  same.^ 

In  1849,  the  year  following  that  in  which  our 
war  with  Mexico  terminated,  Mr.  Hise,  our  rep- 
resentative in  Guatemala,  signed  a  treaty  with 

1  Public  Treaties,  1875,  p.  558. 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      45 

the  Republic  of  Nicaragua,  without  instructions 
from  this  Government,  by  the  terms  of  which 
Nicaragua  granted  to  the  United  States  an  ex- 
clusive right  of  way  across  her  territory  for  the 
construction  of  a  canal ;  and  the  United  States 
guaranteed  to  Nicaragua  the  protection  of  her 
territory  and  assured  her  of  support  in  any  war 
for  its  defence. 

The  relinquishment  by  Great  Britain  of  all 
claim  to  the  disputed  territory  west  of  the 
Rockies  by  the  treaty  of  June  15,  1846,  and 
the  vast  accessions  to  the  territory  of  the  United 
States  consequent  upon  the  termination  of  the 
war  with  Mexico  by  virtue  of  the  treaty  of 
Guadalupe  Hidalgo  of  Feb.  2,  1848,  demon- 
strated to  this  country  the  necessity  of  some 
kind  of  established  Isthmian  communication. 
\But  as  the  completion  and  successful  operation 
of  a  water-way  which  should  thus  make  possible 
the  most  direct  communication  by  sea  between 
Western  Europe  and  the  commercial  centres  of 
Asia  was  quite  as  likely  to  subserve  the  inter- 
ests of  Great  Britain  as  those  of  the  United 
States,  it  was  natural  that  the  former  country 
should  lay  claim  to  a  participation  in  the 
arrangements  or  stipulations  which  might  ^be 
necessary  before  the  prosecution  of  the  work.  \ 


46  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

It  seems  that  there  had  long  dwelt  upon  the 
eastern  shore  of  the  Atlantic  coast  of  the  Isth- 
mus a  tribe  of  Indians  called  Mosquitoes,  over 
whom  Great  Britain  claimed  to  exercise  some 
\  kind  of  protection.  In  the  latter  part  of  the 
seventeenth  century  a  Spanish  ship  freighted 
with  negroes  was  wrecked  upon  the  coast ;  and, 
as  they  were  saved,  considerable  negro  blood 
was  in  time  grafted  upon  the  original  Mos- 
quito stock.  These  people  were  without  laws  or 
any  kind  of  political  organization  ;  they  had 
only  a  slight  regard  for  the  institution  of  mar- 
riage, and  in  instincts  and  habits  were  little 
superior  to-xifdinary  savages.  The  British  claim 
was,  that  as  the  result  of  a  friendship  between 
the  Mosquitoes  and  the  early  buccaneers  these 
Indians  sought  and  secured  the  protection  of 
England  about  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  and  that  the  British  protectorate  was 
[  never  discontinued  or  renounced. 

Differences  arose  between  these  Indians  and 
the  Kepublic  of  Nicaragua,  and  on  Jan.  9, 1848, 
the  Nicaraguans  hoisted  their  flag  in  San  Juan 
del  Norte  (called  Grey  Town),  which  was  gener- 
ally regarded  as  the  necessary  terminus  of  any 
railroad  or  canal  across  the  Isthmus  ivitkm  the 
territory  of  Nicaragua.     Only  a  few  weeks  after, 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      47 

on  February  2,  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo 
between  this  country  and  Mexico  was  signed, 
and  immediately  after,  Great  Britain  espoused 
the  cause  of  the  Mosquitoes  and  forced  the 
Nicaraguans  to  terms.  c*^-;^.  -.^^ 

As  the  generality  of  Americans  regarded 
the  British  protectorate  of  the  Mosquitoes  as 
a  mere  assumption,  they  viewed  the  seizure  by 
Great  Britain  of  the  port  of  San  Juan  del  Norte 
4iot  only  as  an  unjustifiable  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  Nicaragua,  but  as  an  admission  of 
regret  upon  her  part  that  the  valuable  posses- 
sions of  Mexico  upon  the  Pacific  coast  should 
have  been  ceded  to  this  country,  and  of  fear 
that  if  she  did  not  intervene,  a  canal  might 
be  constructed  across  the  Isthmus  with  Ameri- 
can money  and  under  American  protection  and 
control.  The  relations  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  soon  began  to  assume 
a  threatening  aspect,  and  the  signing  of  the 
treaty  by  Mr.  Hise  in  the  following  year  did 
not  tend  to  harmonize  the  differences. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  President  Taylor  was 
the  appointment  of  a  diplomatic  agent  in  Cen- 
tral America,  who  was  instructed  to  look  closely 
after  the  interests  of  this  country.  Soon  after 
his  arrival  the  British  took  forcible  possession 


48  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

of  the  islands  in  the  Bay  of  Fonseca  on  the 
Pacific  side,  ostensibly  to  enforce  claims  for  in- 
demnity of  British  subjects  against  the  States  of 
Honduras  and  San  Salvador;  but  in  reality,  as 
Americans  believed,  to  call  the  attention  of  this 
country  to  the  desirability  of  an  agreement  rela- 
tive to  the  construction  and  operation  of  the 
proposed  canal.  At  any  rate,  it  was  plam  that 
delay  might  augment  the  misunderstanding  and 
perhaps  precipitate  a  conflict  with  Great  Britain. 
The  path  was  open  to  negotiation;  and  the 
mutual  efforts  of  Mr.  Clayton,  then  Secretary 
of  State  for  this  country,  and  of  Sir  Henry 
Bulwer,  representing  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain,  resulted  in  the  treaty  of  April  19,  1850, 
known  as  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  of  which 
there  have  been  the  most  varying  interpreta- 
tions, and  over  which  there  have  been  warm 
and  protracted  discussions. 

The  following  is  a  synopsis  of  the  treaty :  ^ 

The  convention  is  stated  to  be  for  the  purpose 
of  setting  forth  and  fixing  the  views  and  inten- 
tions of  the  two  Governments,  "  with  reference 
to  any  means  of  communication  by  ship-canal 
which  may  be  constructed  between  the  Atlantic 

1  See  Public  Treaties,  1875,  p.  322. 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      49 

and  Pacific  oceans  by  the  way  of  the  river  San 
Juan  de  Nicaragua,  and  either  or  both  of  the 
lakes  of  Nicaragua  or  Managua,  to  any  port  or 
place  on  the  Pacific  Ocean." 

Art.  I.  ^^either  Government "  will  ever  obtain 
or  maintain  for  itself  any  exclusive  control  over 
the  said  ship-canal); "  nor  erect  or  maintain  any 
fortifications,  "  or  occupy,  or  fortify,  or  colonize, 
or  assume  or  exercise  any  dominion  over  Nica- 
ragua,  Costa  Kica,  the  Mosquito  Coast,  or  any 
part  of  Central  America ;  nor  make  use  of  any 
protection  which  either  aJBfords  or  may  afford, 
or  any  alliance  which  either  has  or  may  have 
to  or  with  any  State  or  people,''  for  any  of  the 
above  purposes,  nor  use  any  alliance  or  influ- 
ence that  either  may  possess  with  any  State  or 
Government  through  whose  territory  the  canal 
may  pass,  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  for  the 
citizens  or  subjects  of  the  one  any  rights  of 
commerce  or  navigation  "  which  shall  not  be 
offered  on  the  same  terms  to  the  citizens  or 
subjects  of  the  other." 

Art.  II.  Vessels  of  both  countries,  in  case  of 
war  between  them^  shall,  while  traversing  the 
canal,  or  at  such  a  distance  from  the  two  ends 
thereof  as  may  hereafter  be  established,  be  ex- 
empted from  blockade,  detention,  or  captureX 


50  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

Art.  III.  Those  constructing  the  canal  under 
the  authority  of  the  local  Governments  to  be 
protected  in  person  and  property. 

Art.  IV.  The  contracting  parties  will  use 
their  influence  with  local  Governments  to  facili- 
tate the  construction  of  the  canal;  and  also 
their  good  offices  to  procure  the  establishment 
of  two  free  ports. 

Art.  Y.  When  completed,  the  contracting 
parties  guarantee  the  protection  and  neutrality 
of  the  canal;)  which  may  be  withdrawn  by 
either  party  upon  six  months'  notice  to  the 
other,  if  the  regulations  concerning  traffic  "  are 
contrary  to  the  spirit  and  intention  of  this 
convention."  . 

Art.  VI.  The  contracting  parties  engage  to 
invite  friendly  States  "  to  enter  into  stipulations 
with  them  similar  to  tho^e  which  they  have  en- 
tered into  with  each  other);  "  also  to  enter  into 
treaty  stipulations  with  the  Central  American 
States  "  for  the  purpose  of  more  effectually 
carrying  out  the  great  design  of  this  conven- 
tion;" and  also  to  use  their  good  offices  to  settle 
differences  between  the  States  of  Central  Amer- 
ica "  as  to  right  or  property  over  the  territory 
through  which  the  said  canal  shall  pass." 

Art.  VII.   The  contracting  parties  agree  to 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.       51 

give  their  support  to  such  reliable  persons  or 
company  as  may  first  offer  to  commence  the 
construction  of  the  canal ;  priority  of  claim  to 
protection  to  belong  to  any  person  or  company 
having  made  preparations  therefor. 

Art.  VIII.  Both  Governments  "  agree  to 
extend  their  protection,  by  treaty  stipulations,  to 
any  other  practicable  communications,  whether 
by  canal  or  railway  across  the  Isthmus,"  and 
especially  to  those  "  which  are  now  proposed  to 
be  established  by  the  way  of  Tehuantepec  or 
Panama."  Both  Governments  shall  approve  of 
the  charges  or  conditions  of  traffic.  Equal 
privileges  shall  be  granted  "  to  the  citizens  and 
subjects  of  every  other  State  which  is  willing 
to  grant  thereto  such  protection  as  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  engage  to  afford.' 


Not  long  after  ratifications  were  exchanged, 
Great  Britain  put  forth  pretensions  to  dominion 
over  certain  territory  which  this  Government 
maintained  was  covered  by  the  terms  of  the 
treaty.  .  The  British  claim  to  Honduras  and 
the  occupation  by  that  Government  of  the  Bay 
Islands  were  regarded  by  this  country  as  plain 
violations  of  the  treaty  engagements.  A  discus- 
sion was  opened  between  the  two  Governments, 


52  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

which  was  prolonged  for  nearly  a  decade.  The 
ambiguous  passages  in  the  treaty  were  sub- 
jected to  rigid  scrutiny^  it  was  attempted  to 
throw  light  upon  the  intentions  of  the  contract- 
ing parties  by  reference  to  the  opinions  of  the 
meaning  of  the  treaty  current  at  the  time  of 
its  ratification,  and  Great  Britain  even  pro- 
posed to  submit  the  matter  to  the  arbitrament 
of  a  friendly  power.  It  is  authentic  that  the 
United  States  Senate  was  largely  influenced  in 
its  ratification  by  the  supposition,  if  not  the  as- 
surance, that  the  construction  of  the  canal  was 
not  to  be  long  delayed.  This  disagreement 
between  the  two  Powers  was  an  effectual  ob- 
stacle to  the  commencement  of  the  undertaking. 
(^However,  in  1856  it  was  believed  that  a  satis- 
factory settlement  would  be  perfected.;  On  the 
17th  of  October  of  that  year  the  Clarendon- 
Dallas  treaty,  with  separate  articles,  was  signed 
by  the  terms  of  which  the  Mosquito  question 
and  other  differences  as  to  dominion  over  Cen- 
tral American  territory  were  set  at  rest.  This 
treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Senate  with  the  ad- 
dition of  certain  amendments,  in  which,  however, 
the  British  Government  declined  to  concur ;  so 
that  the  relative  position  of  the  contracting 
parties  remained  unchanged.j 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.       53 

The  discussion  was  at  once  resumed,  but  in 
1859  and  1860  the  British  Government  signed 
certain  treaties  with  three  of  the  Central  Amer- 
ican Governments,  by  the  terms  of  which  the 
former  so  renounced  or  modified  its  claims  to 
Central  American  territory  as  to  at  least  pacify 
the  Government  of  the  United  States.  These 
were  as  follows  :  —  j 

1.  Convention  with  the  Eepublic  of  Guate- 
mala relative  to  the  boundary  of  British  Hon- 
duras, signed  April  30,  1859. 

2.  Treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Honduras 
respecting  the  Bay  Islands,  the  Mosquito  In- 
dians, etc.,  signed  Nov.  28,  1859. 

In  this  treaty  Great  Britain  recognized  "as 
belonging  to  and  under  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Republic  of  Honduras  the  country  hitherto  oc- 
cupied or  possessed  by  the  Mosquito  Indians ; " 
and  the  Republic  agreed  to  grant  money  for 
their  education. 

3.  Convention  with  the  Republic  of  Nica- 
ragua relative  to  the  Mosquito  Indians,  signed 
Jan.  28,  1860. 

It  was  agreed  that  a  district  within  the  terri- 
tory of  the  Republic  of  Nicaragua  should  be 
assigned  to  the  Mosquito  Indians,  and  that 
the  port  of  Grey  Town,  or  San  Juan  del  Norte, 


54  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

should  be  a  free  port  under  the  sovereign  au- 
thority of  the  Kepublic.^ 

:  During  the  American  Civil  War  the  project 
of  Isthmian  transit  was  allowed  to  slumber; 
but  on  June  21,  1867,  the  Governments  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  Republic  of  Nicaragua 
concluded  a  treaty,  by  the  terms  of  which  the 
former  was  granted  the  most  liberal  rights  of 
transit  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans 
through  the  territory  of  the  latter ;  and  while 
the  United  States  guaranteed  the  neutrality  and 
innocent  use  of  the  same,  it  was  agreed  that  the 
Government  of  that  country  might  employ  mili- 
tary forces  for  the  protection  of  persons  and 
property,  if  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  failed 
so  to  do,  when  such  employment  was  necessary. 
The  treaty  was  to  remain  in  force  for  fifteen 
years,  either  party  to  give  the  other  twelve 
months*  notice  before  the  expiration  of  that 
period  of  its  intention  to  terminate  or  alter 
the  treaty ;  and,  in  default  of  such  notice,  the 

^  For  these  three  treaties  see  British  "  Accounts  and  Papers," 
Ixviii. 

These  treaties  seem  to  have  set  the  vexed  Mosquito  question 
at  rest.  The  Mosquito  Indians  were  apparently  fast  deterio- 
rating, and  a  number  of  years  before,  on  March  9, 1853,  Mr.  Clay- 
ton remarked  in  the  United  States  Senate  that  there  were  not 
more  than  five  hundred  of  them  in  existence,  and  that  they  were 
rapidly  disappearing  from  the  earth. 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.       55 

treaty  to  remain  in  force  until  twelve  months 
from  the  day  on  which  either  party  should  no- 
tify the  other  of  its  intention  to  abrogate  or 
alter  the  same.^ 

Another  decade  elapsed,  and  still  no  work  was 
begun;  but  on  May  15,  1879,  there  was  held  at 
Paris,! at  the  call  and  imder  the  direction  of  no 
less  a  personage  than  Ferdinand  de  Lesseps,  an 
"  Interoceanic  Canal  Congress,"  to  which  this 
Government  deemed  it  advisable  to  send  two 
representatives.  These  were  instructed  not  to 
commit  their  Government  to  the  choice  of  any 
particular  route  for  a  canal,  or  to  offer  aid  in  its 
construction.  \  Their  reception  was  not  a  cour- 
teous one,  and  the  cause  has  been  ascribed  to  the 
fact  that  the  meeting  was  composed  largely  of 
penniless  adherents  of  Napoleon  III.,  who  were 
now  anxious  to  repair  the  fortunes  which  had 
been  shattered  during  the  ineffectual  attempt  of 
that  ruler  to  force  a  monarchy  upon  Mexico. 

The  deliberations  of  this  Congress  pointed 
unmistakably  to  the  early  construction  of  a 
canal  which  has  since  been  undertaken  by  way 
of  Panama,  and  not  through  Nicaragua.  The 
announcement  of  this  project  created  some  dis- 

1  See  Public  Treaties,  1875,  p.  566,  Arts.  XIV.,  XV.,  XX. 


56  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

turbance  of  popular  feeling  in  this  country ;  and 
soon  after,  on  June  25th  of  the  same  year, 
Mr.  Burnside  introduced  the  following  resolu- 
tion in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States :  — 

"  Whereas,  the  people  of  this  Union  have  for  up- 
wards of  fifty  years  adhered  to  the  doctrine  asserted 
by  President  Monroe  'as  a  principle  in  which  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are  in- 
volved, that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free 
and  independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed 
and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered 
as  subjects  for  future '  occupation  '  by  any  European 
power ; '     Therefore, 

"  Resolved^  That  the  people  of  these  States  would 
not  view,  without  serious  inquietude,  any  attempt 
by  the  Powers  of  Europe  to  estabHsh  under  their 
protection  and  domination  a  ship-canal  across  the 
Isthmus  of  Darien ;  and  such  action  on  the  part 
of  any  European  power  could  not  be  regarded  'in 
any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  un- 
friendly disposition  towards  the  United  States.'  *' 

The  resolution  was  referred  to  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Eelations. 

Several  resolutions  were  afterward  introduced 
in  the  National  House  of  Kepresentatives,  re- 
asserting the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  cardinal 
principle  in  our  national  polity,  and  declaring 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      57 

that  any  Isthmian  canal  by  whomsoever  con- 
structed must  be  under  the  protection  of  the 
United  States.  Of  these  the  most  conspicuous, 
introduced  by  Mr.  Crapo  of  Massachusetts  in 
December,  1880,  was  as  follows  :  — 

"  Resolved^  That  the  construction  of  an  interoceanic 
canal  connecting  the  waters  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pa- 
cific oceans  by  means  of  foreign  capital  under  the 
auspices  of  or  through  a  charter  from  any  European 
Government,  is  hostile  to  the  established  policy  of  the 
United  States,  is  in  violation  of  the  spirit  and  dec- 
laration of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  cannot  be  sanc- 
tioned or  assented  to  by  this  Government ;  that  the 
United  States  will  assert  and  maintain  such  control 
and  supervision  over  any  interoceanic  canal  as  may 
be  necessary  to  protect  its  national  interests  and 
means  of  defence,  unity,  and  safety,  and  to  advance 
the  prosperity  and  augment  the  commerce  of  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  States  of  the  Union."  ; 

^The  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  to  whom 
this  resolution  was  referred,  gave  the  subject 
prolonged  attention,  and  finally  made  a  report 
in  which  they  heartily  sustained  the  resolution ; 
but  the  session  closed  without  the  adoption  of 
the  report. 

President  Hayes,  in  transmitting  to  the  Senate 
on   March   9,    1880,  copies   of  correspondence 


58  THE    MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

and  other  papers  relative  to  a  ship-canal 
across  the  Isthmus,  expressed  the  following 
views :  — 

1.  The  policy  of  this  country  is  a  canal  under 
American  control.  If  existing  treaties  or  the 
rights  of  sovereignty  or  property  of  other  na- 
tions stand  in  the  way  of  this  policy,  negotia- 
tions should  be  entered  into  to  establish  the 
American  policy  consistently  with  the  rights 
of  the  nations  to  be  affected  by  it. 

2.  The  capital  invested  in  the  enterprise  must 
look  for  protection  to  one  or  more  of  the  great 
powers  of  the  world.  No  European  power  can  be 
allowed  to  intervene  for  such  protection.  The 
United  States  "  must  exercise  such  control  as 
will  enable  this  country  to  protect  its  national 
interests  and  maintain  the  rights  of  those  whose 
private  capital  is  embarked  in  the  work." 

3.  Such  a  canal  would  virtually  be  "a  part 
of  the  coast  line  of  the  United  States;"  and 
its  relations  to  this  country  "are  matters  of 
paramount  concern  to  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  No  other  great  power  would,  under 
similar  circumstances,  fail  to  assert  a  rightful 
control  over  a  work  so  closely  and  vitally  af- 
fecting its  interest  and  welfare."  ^ 

^  See  Congressional  Record,  vol.  x.  p.  1399. 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      59 

At  the  time  of  the  inauguration  of  President 
Garfield  the  construction  of  the  proposed  canal 
by  foreign  capitalists  without  an  understanding 
as  to  an  American  protectorate  was  still  viewed 
with  great  concern.  In  his  inaugural  the  Presi- 
dent said :  ""  We  shall  urge  no  narrow  policy, 
nor  seek  peculiar  or  exclusive  privileges  in  any 
commercial  route ;  but,  in  the  language  of  my 
predecessor,  I  believe  it  to  be  '  the  right  and 
duty  of  the  United  States  to  assert  and  maintain 
such  supervision  and  authority  over  any  inter- 
oceanic  canal  across  the  Isthmus  that  connects 
North  and  South  America  as  will  protect  our 
national  interests.'  " 

fH  is  probable  that  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  relative  to  the  undertaking  of  M.  de  Les- 
seps  received  early  attention  in  the  cabinet  of 
President  Garfield,  for  the  first  communication  ^ 
of  Mr.  Blaine,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  Lowell, 
our  Minister  to  Great  Britain,  bears  the  early 
date  of  June  24,  1881.  After  referring  to  the 
reports  current  as  to  a  guarantee  of  the  neutral- 
ity of  the  proposed  canal  on  the  part  of  Euro- 
pean powers,  Mr.  Blaine  states  the  position  of 

^  Most  of  the  correspondence  on  this  subject  hereinafter  re- 
ferred to  is  given  in  British  '<  Accounts  and  Papers,"  Ixxx.,  and 
all  of  it  in  '♦  Foreign  Relations,"  1881,  1882,  and  1883. 


60  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

the  United  States  in  language  substantially  as 
follows :  — 

1.  The  United  States  recognizes  a  proper 
guarantee  of  neutrality  as  essential ;  and  this 
has  already  been  provided  for  by  our  treaty  of 
1846  with  the  Republic  of  New  Granada. 

2.  The  United  States  will  not  interfere  with 
the  enterprise  as  a  commercial  one ;  but  its 
political  control  must  be  in  the  hands  of  this 
country. 

The  United  States  does  not  desire  exclusive 
privileges  accorded  American  ships  in  time  of 
peace ;  but "  the  possessions  of  the  United  States 
upon  the  Pacific  coast  are  imperial  in  extent 
and  of  extraordinary  growth."  They  would 
supply  the  larger  part  of  the  traffic  through 
the  canal,  and  it  is  this  domestic  function  which 
has  caused  the  project  to  be  regarded  as  of  vital 
importance  by  this  Government. 

3.  An  agreement  between  the  powers  of 
Europe  to  jointly  guarantee  the  neutrality  and 
in  effect  control  the  political  character  of  the 
canal  would  be  viewed  by  this  Government 
with  the  gravest  concern. 

4.  The  United  States  has  never  offered  to 
take  part  in  agreements  in  which  European 
powers  have   united,   such  as    guarantees    of 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.       61 

neutrality  touching  the  political  condition  of 
certain  European  States ;  and  it  is  the  long- 
settled  conviction  of  this  Government  that  any 
extension  to  our  shores  of  the  political  system 
of  Europe  "  would  be  attended  with  danger  to 
the  peace  and  welfare  of  this  nation." 

5.  The  position  of  the  United  States  "  is  noth- 
ing more  than  the  pronounced  adherence  of  the 
United  States  to  principles  long  since  enunciated 
by  the  highest  authority  of  the  Government, 
and  now,  in  the  judgment  of  the  President, 
firmly  inwoven  as  an  integral  and  important 
part  of  our  national  policy." 

Earl  Granville  replied  to  Mr.  Hoppin,  Secre- 
tary of  Legation,  Nov.  10,  1881,  acknowledging 
receipt  of  a  copy  of  Mr.  Blaine's  despatch  to 
Mr.  Lowell,  and  stating  that  the  position  of 
Great  Britain  was  determined  by  the  provisions 
of  the  Clay ton-Bulwer  treaty, 
/^o  this  statement  Mr.  Blaine  replied  in  his 
letter  to  Mr.  Lowell  of  Nov.  19,  1881.  The 
following  is  a  summary  of  his  views  :  — 

1.  [The  Clayton-Bulwer  convention  was  made 
more  xhan  thirty  years  ago,  under  conditions 
which  "were  temporary  in  their  nature  and 
which  can  never  be  reproduced."  The  re- 
markable  development   of  the   United   States 


62  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

on  the  Pacific  coast  since  that  time  has  created 
duties  for  the  Government,  the  discharge  of 
which  requires  some  modifications  in  the 
treaty. 

2.  "The  operation  of  the  treaty  practically 
concedes  to  Great  Britain  the  control  of  what- 
ever canal  may  be  constructed/'  It  is  incum- 
bent upon  Great  Britain,  with  its  extended 
colonial  possessions,  "  to  maintain  a  vast  naval 
establishment,  which  in  our  continental  solidity 
we  do  not  need."  Hence  if  the  United  States 
binds  itself  not  to  fortify  on  land.  Great  Britain 
would  have  an  advantage  which  would  prove 
decisive  in  the  possible  case  of  struggle  for  the 
control  of  the  canal. 

3.  The  treaty  binds  the  United  States  not 
to  use  its  military  force  in  any  precautionary 
measure,  while  it  leaves  the  naval  power  of 
Great  Britain  perfectly  free  and  unrestrained. 
If  no  American  soldier  is  to  be  quartered  on  the 
Isthmus,  no  war  vessel  of  Great  Britain  should 
be  allowed  in  the  waters  controlling  either 
entrance  to  the  canal. 

4.  ^  This  Government,  with  respect  to  Euro- 
pean States,  will  not  consent  to  perpetuate  any 
treaty  that  impeaches  our  rightful  and  long- 
established  claim  to  priority  on  the  American 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TKEATT.      63 

continent."  \  The  United  States  seeks  to  defend 
its  interests  as  Great  Britain  defends  hers.  It 
would  be  as  reasonable  for  the  United  States 
to  demand  a  share  in  the  fortifications  by  which 
Great  Britain  excludes  all  other  powers  from 
the  waters  of  the  Red  Sea  and  thus  virtually 
controls  the  Suez  Canal,  or  to  demand  their 
neutralization,  as  for  England  to  make  the  same 
demand  in  perpetuity  from  the  United  States 
with  respect  to  the  transit  across  the  American 
continent. 

5.  The  possessions  of  the  United  States  upon 
the  Pacific  Ocean  are  now  of  vast  extent.  The 
money  value  of  their  surplus  for  export  will  in 
the  near  future  "  be  as  large  as  that  of  British 
India,  and  perhaps  larger."  India  is  a  distant 
colony,  but  "the  region  on  the  Pacific  is  an 
integral  portion  of  our  National  Union."  The 
inhabitants  of  the  former  "  are  alien  from  Eng- 
land in  race,  language,  and  religion ;  the  citi- 
zens of  the  latter  are  of  our  own  blood  and 
kindred."  Great  Britain  cannot  therefore  ob- 
ject to  the  United  States  adopting  measures 
^^for  holding  absolute  control  of  the  great 
water-way  which  shall  unite  the  two  oceans, 
and  which  the  United  States  will  always  insist 
upon  treating  as  part  of  her  coast  line." 


64  THE   MONEOE   DOCTKINE. 

6.  By  the  supervision  of  the  United  States 
alone  can  the  canal  be  secured  against  the  ob- 
struction incident  to  war.  The  United  States 
is  least  likely  of  all  Governments  to  be  engaged 
in  war;  so  that  while  for  self-protection  she 
asserts  her  right  to  control  the  canal,  she  also 
offers  its  absolute  neutralization  as  respects 
European  powers. 

7.  Other  leading  nations  since  1850  have 
greatly  enlarged  their  commercial  connections 
with  Central  America.  The  canal  scheme  now 
projected  finds  a  national  sponsor  in  the  Re- 
public of  France,  and  non-intervention  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  would  paralyze  its 
arm  in  any  attempt  to  assert  the  plain  rights 
and  privileges  which  the  Government  acquired 
through  its  treaty  with  the  Republic  of 
Colombia. 

8.  One  of  the  motives  which  induced  the  Gov- 
ernment to  assent  to  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
plainly  inferable  from  every  line  of  it,  was  the 
expected  aid  of  British  capital.  That  expecta- 
tion has  not  been  realized.  The  changed  con- 
dition of  this  country  since  1850  has  diminished 
any  advantage  to  be  derived  from  that  source. 
The  resources  of  our  own  Government  and 
people  are  sufficient  to  construct  it.     Foreign 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      65 

capital  cannot  enter  as  an  essential  factor  into 
the  determination  of  this  problem. 

9.  Mr.  Blaine  then  proposes  a  modification  of 
the  treaty /in  five  particulars  :  — 

(1)  Every  part  which  forbids  the  United  States 
fortifying  the  canal  and  holding  the  political 
control  of  it  in  conjunction  with  the  country  in 
which  it  is  located,  to  be  cancelled. 

(2)  Every  part  in  which  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  agree  to  make  no  acquisi- 
tion of  territory  in  Central  America,  to  remain 
in  full  force. 

(3)  No  objection  to  maintaining  the  clause 
looking  to  the  establishment  of  a  free  port  at 
each  end  of  the  proposed  canal. 

(4)  The  clause  to  the  effect  that  treaty  stipu- 
lations should  be  made  for  a  joint  protectorate 
of  any  railway  or  canal  never  having  been  per- 
fected, to  be  regarded  as  obsolete. 

(5)  The  distance  from  either  end  of  the  canal 
where,  in  time  of  war,  captures  might  be  made, 
to  h^  as  liberal  as  possible. 

10\  ThpUnitpd  States  will  act  in  entire  har- 
mony ^ithjlia_iiavernia£^  ter- 
ritorv  jjie  canal  shall  be  located  a  and  it  shall 
be  used  only  for  the  development  and  increase 
of  peaceful  commerce  among  all  nations- 

6 


66  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

In  a  communication  to  Mr.  Lowell  dated  Nov. 
29,  1881,  Mr.  Blaine  refers  to  the  early  dissatis- 
faction with  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and  to 
the  differences  of  interpretation  of  the  same. 
After  referring  to  the  attempt  to  adjust  all 
differences  by  the  ineffectual  Clarendon-Dallas 
treaty  negotiated  on  the  17th  of  October,  1856, 
he  makes  copious  extracts  from  the  communi- 
cations of  General  Cass,  Secretary  of  State  under 
President  Buchanan,  and  of  Lord  Napier  the  Brit- 
ish Representative,  looking  to  a  modification  of 
the  treaty,  as  "  it  was  frankly  admitted  on  both 
sides  that  the  engagements  of  the  treaty  were 
misunderstandingly  entered  into,  imperfectly 
comprehended,  contradictorilj''  interpreted,  and 
mutually  vexatious."  That  these  last  commu- 
nications of  Mr.  Blaine  to  Mr.  Lowell  had  the 
sanction  of  President  Arthur,  is  presumed  from 
the  reference  to  the  subject  in  his  first  message 
to  Congress,  shortly  after  those  communications 
were  sent.^  After  referring  to  the  treaty  of 
1846  with  Colombia,  he  states  that  he  has  sup- 
plemented the  action  of  his  predecessor  "  by 
proposing  to  her  Majesty's  Government  the 
modification  of  that  instrument  [that  is,  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty],  and  the  abrogation  of 

1  See  President  Arthur's  Message,  Dec.  6,  1881. 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      67 

such  claims  thereof  as  do  not  comport  with  the 
obligations  of  the  United  States  toward  Colom- 
bia, or  with  the  vital  needs  of  the  two  friendly 
parties  to  the  compact." 

Earl  Granville's  answer  to  Mr.  Blaine's  letter 
to  Mr.  Lowell  of  Nov.  19,  1881,  is  contained 
in  his  communication  to  Mr.  West,  the  British 
Minister  at  Washington,  bearing  date  of  Jan.  7, 
1882.  Earl  Granville'  thinks  that  the  princi- 
ples upon  which  the  argument  of  Mr.  Blaine 
is  founded  are  novel  in  international  law.  He 
denies  any  analogy  as  to  the  Suez  Canal,  and 
questions  Mr.  Blaine's  statements  as  to  that 
canal  as  practically  and  historically  incorrect. 
He  thinks  that  the  •  development  of  the  United 
States  on  the  Pacific  coast  was  within  the  view 
of  the  statesmen  who  were  parties  to  the  treaty 
of  1850.  Great  Britain's  colonial  possessions 
upon  the  Pacific  coast  have  also  greatly  devel- 
oped since  the  treaty  was  signed.  Great  Britain 
desires  the  security  on  a  general  international 
basis  of  the  universal  and  unrestrained  use  of 
the  canal.  The  fortifications  by  one  power 
would  be  followed  by  those  of  another.  If  the 
United  States  insists  on  treating  the  water-way 
which  shall  unite  the  two  oceans  "  as  part  of 


68  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

her  coast  line/'  intermediate  States  will  certainly 
become  less  independent  than  at  present,  j 

To  Mr.  Blaine's  letter  of  Nov.  29,  1881,  to 
Mr.  Lowell,  Earl  Granville  replies  in  his  com- 
munication of  Jan.  14,  1882,  to  Mr.  West.  He 
quotes  freely  from  despatches  relating  to  the 
controversy  between  the  Governments  which 
was  carried  on  from  1856  to  1860,  and  makes 
an  ingenious  and  able  argument.  He  declares 
that  Mr.  Blaine's  account  of  negotiations  ends 
at  a  point  where  the  most  important  episode 
commences ;  namely,  that  in  1859  and  in  1860 
treaties  were  concluded  between  Great  Britain 
separately  with  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and  Nica- 
ragua in  settlement  of  all  questions  relating  to 
Central  American  differences,  and  that  President 
Buchanan,  in  his  message  to  Congress  of  Dec.  3, 
1860,  said  that  the  discordant  constructions  of 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  "  have  resulted  in  a 
final  settlement  entirely  satisfactory  to  this  Gov- 
ernment." Earl  Granville  concludes  by  saying, 
"  I  have  been  forced  to  give  the  above  extracts 
at  considerable  length,  and  I  refrain  from  adding 
other  passages  which  would  tend  to  illustrate 
and  confirm  them."  A  perusal  of  them,  he 
thinks,  will  sufl&ce  to  show  certain  points  which 
are  briefly  as  follows :  — 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      69 

1.  That  the  differences  between  the  two  Gov- 
ernments simply  had  their  origin  in  a  stipulation 
which  Mr.  Blaine  still  proposes  in  great  part  to 
maintain. 

2.  That  the  declarations  of  the  United  States 
Government  during  the  controversy  were  dis- 
tinctly at  variance  with  any  such  proposal  as 
that  just  stated. 

3.  That  at  a  time  when  the  British  Govern- 
ment had  been  induced  by  the  long  contin- 
uance of  the  controversy  to  contemplate  the 
abrogation  of  the  treaty,  they  were  only  will- 
ing to  do  so  on  the  condition  of  reverting 
to  the  status  quo  ante  its  conclusion  in  1850 ;  a 
solution  which  was  at  that  time  possible  — 
though,  as  the  United  States  Government  justly 
pointed  out,  it  would  have  been  fraught  with 
great  danger  to  the  good  relations  between 
the  two  countries  —  but  which  is  now  ren- 
dered impossible  by  the  subsequent  events. 

4.  That  a  conclusion  was  effected  by  the  vol- 
untary action  of  Great  Britain.  She  practically 
conceded  the  points  in  dispute,  and  President 
Buchanan,  as  stated  above,  declared  the  settle- 
ment entirely  satisfactory  to  his  Government. 

Mr.  Frelinghuysen,  who  succeeded  Mr.  Blaine 
as  Secretary  of  State,  transmitted  to  Mr.  Lowell, 


70  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

on  May  8,  1882,  a  communication  of  which  the 
following  may  be  regarded  as  a  synopsis  :  — 

A  protectorate  of  the  United  States  and  of 
the  republic  whose  territory  the  canal  may 
cross  only  required.  A  protectorate  by  Euro- 
pean nations  would  be  in  conflict  with  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  which  "  is  cherished  by  the 
American  people,  and  has  been  approved  by 
the  Government  of  Great  Britain."  Great 
Britain  exercises  dominion  over  Balize,  or  Brit- 
ish Honduras,  and  the  impression  prevails  that 
•since  1850  the  English  inhabitants  of  that  dis- 
trict have  spread  into  the  territory  of  the  neigh- 
boring republics.  Both  countries  have  not  the 
right  to  exercise  dominion  over  or  to  colonize 
one  foot  of  territory  in  Central  America.  If 
Great  Britain  has  violated  and  continues  to 
violate  that  provision,  the  treaty  is  voidable  at 
the  pleasure  of  the  United  States. 

President  Buchanan,  in  his  message  of  Dec.  3, 
1860,  referred  to  the  dispossession  of  Great 
Britain  of  the  occupation  of  one  end  of  the 
Nicaragua  route,  and  not  to  the  colonization 
of  British  Honduras.  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  nar- 
rates how  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  en- 
tered into,  and  shows  that  the  object  was  to 
insure   at   the   earliest    possible    moment    the 


THE  CANAL  AND   THE  TREATY.      71 

completion  of  the  canal.  Steps  were  taken,  but 
the  project  failed.  The  canal  now  in  question 
is  on  the  Panama,  and  not  on  the  Nicaragua 
route.  Article  VIII.  of  the  treaty  relates  to 
transit  other  than  by  the  Nicaragua  route.  But 
the  United  States  entered  into  the  treaty  of 
1846  with  New  Granada,  which  is  still  in  force. 
Article  VIII.  relates  only  to  those  projects  7iow 
proposed  to  be  established,  and  contemplates  fur- 
ther "  treaty  stipulation "  before  Great  Britain 
can  join  the  United  States  in  the  protectorate 
of  the  canal  by  the  Panama  route. 

Earl  Granville's  reply  was  to  Mr.  West,  dated 
Dec.  30,1882:  — 

1.  He  cannot  agree  with  Mr.  Frelinghuysen 
as  to  the  meaning  of  Article  VIII.  of  the  Clay- 
ton-Bulwer  treaty. 

2.  He  claims  that  the  United  States  cannot 
abrogate  that  treaty  by  reason  of  the  existence 
of  things  which  has  prevailed,  to  their  knowl- 
edge, before  as  well  as  since  its  ratification,  to 
which  the  treaty  was  never  intended  to  apply, 
and  notwithstanding  the  known  existence  of 
which  they  have  more  than  once  recognized  the 
treaty  as  subsisting. 

3.  He  does  not  think,  as  Mr.  Frelinghuysen 


72  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

suggests,  that  any  necessity  exists  for  a  fresh 
agreement  between  the  two  countries  having 
for  its  object  the  retention  and  renewal  of  cer- 
tain provisions  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 

In  his  communication  of  May  5,  1883,  to 
Mr.  Lowell,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  replied  to  Lord 
Granville's  communication  of  Dec.  30,  1882. 
After  reiterating  his  former  views,  he  remarks  : 
"In  the  conviction,  therefore,  that  the  argu- 
ments heretofore  presented  by  the  United  States 
remain  unshaken,  the  President  adheres  to  the 
views  set  forth  in  the  instruction  to  you  of 
May  8,  1882.'' 

Lord  Granville  replied  Aug.  17,  1883,  reiter- 
ating his  former  views,  and  stating  not  only  that 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  not  adhered  to  by  all  of 
Mr.  Monroe's  successors,  but  that  the  mere  fact 
that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  entered  into 
by  the  two  Governments  to  jointly  protect  the 
communication  which  might  be  made  between  the 
two  oceans  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  statement 
that  that  doctrine  is  applicable  to  the  case. 

Mr.  FrelinghuysSn  t)riefly  replied  in  a  letter 
to  Mr.  Lowell  bearing  date^Nov.  22,  1883. 

In  concluding  this  subject,  it  should  be  ob- 
served  that  there  is  "very  little  question  but 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      73 

that  Mr.  Clayton  intended,  in  negotiating  the 
treaty  of  1850,  to  disregard  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine as  in  any  sense  binding.  Such  was  his 
own  avowal  when,  on  becoming  a  member  of 
the  United  States  Senate  only  a  few  years  after, 
he  was  drawn  into  a  bitter  and  protracted  dis- 
cussion with  General  Cass  of  Michigan  as  to  the 
origin  and  meaning  of  the  treaty  and  as  to  the 
intentions  of  the  contracting  parti  e§|  However, 
it  has  been  ever  since  maintained  by  American 
statesmen  that  a  departure  in  one  instance  from 
the  spirit  and  letter  of  President  Monroe's  dec- 
laration is  in  no  sense  its  abandonment  as  a 
national  doctrine. 

(j'he  discussions  and  writings  to  which  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  has  given  rise  would 
fill  volumes  )i  but  it  is  fair  to  say  that  for 
many  years  there  has  been  a  growing  con- 
viction among  conservative  Americans  that  an 
occasion  is  offered  for  the  application  of  the 
principle  of  international  law,  —  that  when  the 
circumstances  which  accompany  the  negotia- 
tion of  a  treaty  have  changed,  and  the  move- 
ments in  population  and  wealth  have  made  it 
necessary,  either  party  has  a  right  to  avoid 
the  treaty,  provided  fEe  other  refuses  to  agree 
to  appropriate  modifications. 


74  THE   MONROE   DOCTKINE. 

On  Feb.  12,  1856,  Mr.  Wilson  of  Massachu- 
setts, in  a  speech  in  the  United  States  Senate, 
expressed  the  following  sentiments  :  — 

"The  only  way,  in  my  judgment,  to  get  out  of 
our  present  embarrassment  is  to  declare  the  Clayton- 
Bulvver  treaty  null  and  void,  —  to  negotiate  in  Central 
America  for  the  protection  of  our  transit  routes  across 
that  country.  It  is  the  policy  which  will,  in  my  judg- 
ment, promote  the  future  peace  and  interest  of  the 
country.  I  would  vote  against  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  if  it  were  before  us  to-day ;  for  I  can  never 
agree  to  make  an  arrangement  with  England  or  any 
other  foreign  Power  that  we  will  not  ^exercise  domin- 
ion over  any  portion  of  this  continent."  ^ 

In  urging  upon  Lord  Granville  their  reasons 
why  a  modification  of  the  treaty  was  both  de- 
sirable and  necessary,  it  is  probable  that  both 
Secretaries  Blaine  and  Frelinghuysen  bore  in 
mind  not  only  the  rule  of  international  law  just 
referred  to,  but  the  striking  example  of  the  modi- 
fication of  a  treaty  in  recent  times  ;  an  allusion 
to  which  may  appropriately  close  the  chapter.^ 

By  the  treaty  of  Paris,  March,  1856,  which 
terminated  the  Crimean  War,  it  was  agreed  that 

1  Congressional  Globe,  34th  Congress,  1st  session ;  Appendix 

2  See  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1870,  p.  257;  1871,  p.  275.  Herts- 
let's  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  iii.  1904-1924. 


THE  CANAL  AND  THE  TREATY.      75 

the  Black  Sea  should  be  neutralized.  In  Octo- 
ber, 1870,  Prince  GortschakofF  called  upon  Lord 
Granville  for  modifications  of  the  treaty,  assign- 
ing as  a  cause  that  certain  Powers  had  been 
guilty  of  infractions  thereof;  "in  presence  of 
which,"  he  said,  "  it  would  be  difficult  to  affirm 
that  written  law,  founded  upon  respect  for  trea- 
ties as  a  base  of  public  law  and  rule  for  the  re- 
lations between  States,  has  preserved  the  same 
moral  sanction  which  it  may  have  had  in  other 
times." 

In  a  communication  in  the  following  month 
of  November,  the  Prince  said :  "  Earl  Granville 
will  agree  that  the  Europe  of  to-day  is  very  far 
from  being  the  Europe  which  signed  the  treaty 
of  1856.  It  was  impossible  that  Russia  should 
agree  to  remain  the  only  Power  bound  indefi- 
nitely to  an  arrangement  which,  onerous  as  it 
was  at  the  time  when  it  was  concluded,  became 
daily  weaker  in  its  guarantees." 

(it  is  fair  to  remark  that  in  the  following  year 
an  agreement  was  arrived  at  by  several  of  the 
Powers,  that  no  party  is  at  liberty  to  abolish  a 
treaty  or  withdraw  from  it  without  the  consent 
of  all  parties  in  interest.  This  gave  Great  Britain 
an  opportunity  to  gracefully  yield  to  the  demands 
of  her  adversary,  and  a  treaty  was  signed  by  the 


76  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

great  Powers  in  the^arly  part  of  1871,  modify- 
ing the  treaty  of  1856J  and  thus  practically  grant- 
ing all  the  concessions  which  Russia  desired.^ 

^  The  construction  of  the  proposed  water-way  is  at  present  a 
subject  of  great  popular  interest.  There  is  little  probability 
that  M.  de  Lesseps'  canal  at  Panama  will  be  completed  for 
several  years,  if  at  all.  A  vast  sum  of  money  has  been  already 
expended,  and  only  a  beginning  has  been  made.  But  as  Co- 
lombia is  in  a  constant  state  of  insurrection  and  bankruptcy, 
the  fear  of  Americans  is  that  it  would  ''  be  easy  for  the  French 
at  an  opportune  moment  to  make  an  issue  with  the  local 
authorities;  the  home  Government  would  be  called  upon  to 
protect  its  subjects,  and  in  such  a  case  there  is  no  reason  to 
believe  that  it  would  not  try  to  realize,  if  it  could,  the  dream 
of  French  statesmen  as  to  the  role  of  France  in  countries  of 
Latin  origin.'*  See  the  Nation,  vol.  xxx.  p.  90.  In  this  con- 
nection the  words  of  M.  de  Lesseps  himself  in  the  North  Ameri- 
can Review,  vol.  cxxx.  p.  12,  may  be  of  some  interest  :  "The 
Monroe  Doctrine,  so  far  from  being  opposed  to  our  enterprise, 
is  directly  favorable  to  it,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  Republic  of 
the  United  States  of  Colombia  which  has  granted  the  conces- 
sion for  the  Panama  Canal;  and  the  decree  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States  of  Colombia,  of  the  3d  of  September,  1879, 
as  well  as  the  letter  of  the  Governor  of  Panama,  which  informed 
me  of  that  decree,  very  plainly  signify  that  the  nations  of  that 
part  of  America  are  heartily  enlisted  in  the  undertaking." 

In  regard  to  Nicaragua,  the  intention  of  intersecting  that 
country  is  still  entertained,  and  a  treaty  between  the  Govern- 
ments of  Nicaragua  and  the  United  States,  giving  the  latter  the 
most  liberal  rights  over  a  water-way  through  the  territory  of 
the  former,  failed  of  ratification  in  the  United  States  Senate 
Jan.  29,  1885;  but  an  amendment  looking  to  the  abrogation  or 
modification  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  adopted. 

For  an  able  discussion  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  from  an 
English  stand-point,  see  "Some  Disputed  Questions  in  Inter- 
national Law,"  by  T.  J.  Laurence,  recently  published. 


CUBA.  77 


CHAPTER  VI. 

CUBA. 

The  history  of  Cuba  is  the  history  of  political 
disturbance.  This  is  especially  true  of  the  isl- 
and since  the  deposition  of  the  royal  family  of 
Spain  by  Napoleon  I.,  in  the  early  part  of  this 
century.  Cuba  remained  loyal  to  the  Spanish 
crown,  and  has  ever  since  been  in  the  hands 
of  successive  Captain-Generals,  who  have  been 
sent  out  from  Spain  armed  with  authority 
almost  unlimited.  The  antagonism  between 
these  rulers  and  the  native  Cubans  has  been 
intense ;  the  latter  of  whom  the  Spanish  crown 
has  in  vain  endeavored  to  subjugate  or  sup- 
press. 

Cuba  is  not  only  rich  in  resources,  but  a 
glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  she  commands 
the  approaches  to  a  large  portion  of  our  national 
frontier.  It  is  plain,  also,  that  any  increased 
facility  of  Isthmian  transit,  such  as  a  successfully 
operated  canal,  must  result  in  placing  the  com- 
merce benefited  thereby  more  or  less  under  the 


78  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

supervision  of  the  fleets  which  find  a  haven  in 
her  numerous  harbors. 

After  the  cession  to  the  United  States  by 
France  of  Louisiana  in  1803,  and  more  particu- 
larly by  Spain  of  Florida  in  1819,  Cuba  was 
naturally  regarded  by  many  Americans  as  a 
probable,  if  not  necessary,  acquisition  by  this 
country.  ;  But  Spain  was  loath  to  parLjsith  so 
valuable  a  possession,  even  though  it  was  the 
theatre  of  constant  insurrection  and  warfare; 
and  England  seconded  her  in  her  resolution, 
because  she  apprehended  that  the  transfer  of 
that  island  to  the  United  States  would  to  a 
certain  extent  jeopardize  the  commercial  inter- 
ests of  Great  Britain,  especially  in  the  event  of 
the  completion  and  operation  of  an  interoceanic 
canal. 

The  separation  of  the  Spanish- American  colo- 
nies from  the  mother  country  was  the  admitted 
failure  of  Spanish  colonial  policy.  It  was  nat- 
ural, therefore,  to  suppose  that  the  true  de- 
velopment of  the  resources  of  Cuba  would  be 
impossible  under  Spanish  dominion.  Hence  the 
apparently  well-grounded  apprehension  of  emi- 
nent Americans  that  England  or  some  other 
European  power  contemplated  the  acquisition  of 
that  island,  or  its  government  under  a  European 


CUBA.  79 

protectorate,  with  the  real  design  of  protecting 
European  shipping  which  might  eventually  pass 
through  the  contemplated  canal. 

Mr.  Clay,  while  Secretary  of  State,  in  a  com- 
munication to  Mr.  Brown,  the  American  Minis- 
ter to  France,  dated  Oct.  25,  1825,  referred  to 
the  fact  that  in  the  preceding  summer  "  a  large 
French  fleet  visited  the  American  seas  and  the 
coast  of  the  United  States ; ''  and  stated  "  that 
the  purpose  of  any  similar  movement,  hereafter, 
made  in  a  season  of  peace,  should  be  communi- 
cated to  this  Government."^ 

In  regard  to  the  islands  of  Cuba  and  Porto 
Eico,  he  said  :  — 

"  The  views  of  the  Executive  of  the  United  States 
in  regard  to  them  have  been  already  disclosed  to 
France  by  you,  on  the  occasion  of  inviting  its  co- 
operation to  bring  about  a  peace  between  Spain  and 
her  former  colonies,  in  a  spirit  of  great  frankness. 
It  was  stated  to  the  French  Government  that  the 
United  States  could  not  see,  with  indifference,  these 
islands  passing  frpm  Spain  to  any  other  European 
power;  and  that(for  ourselves,  no  change  was  de- 
sired in  their  present  political  knd  commercial  condi- 
tion, nor  in  the  possession  wl^ch  Spain  has  of  them. 
In  the  same  spiriVand  with  the  hope  of  guarding, 
beforehand,  against  any  possible  difficulties  on  that 
subject  that  may  arise,  you  will  now  add  that  we 


80  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

could  not  consent  to  the  occupation  of  those  islands 
by  any  other  European  power  than  Spain,  under  any 
contingency  whatever.  Cherishing  no  designs  on 
them  ourselves,  we  have  a  fair  claim  to  an  unreserved 
knowledge  of  the  views  of  other  great  maritime 
Pqwers  in  respect  to  them."  ^ 

\hi  regard  to  the  fleet  whose  presence  in  the 
American  seas  so  disturbed  the  Government  of 
the  United  States,  the  French  Government  re- 
plied that  its  purpose  was  to  look  out  for  French 
interests  to  the  south  of  this  country;  and  in 
regard  to  the  attitude  of  France  toward  Cuba, 
Mr.  Clay  was  assured  that  there  was  an  entire 
concurrence  by  the  French  Government  in  the 
views  expressed  by  him. 

But  this  did  not  wholly  allay  apprehension. 
There  was  still  entertained  in  this  country  a 
general  hostility  to  any  suggestion  of  the  pos- 
session of  Cuba  by  any  European  power  except 
Spain ;  and  those  who  entertained  it  found  a 
ready  exponent  in  Mr.  Webster,  in  his  speech 
in  the  House  of  Representatives  in  April,  1826, 
on  the  Panama  Mission,^  and  also  in  Mr.  Calhoun, 
in  his  speech  in  the  Senate  on  May  15, 1848, 
on  the  Proposed  Occupation  of  Yucatan ;   the 

1  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1825,  1826,  p.  425. 

2  See  page  32. 


CUBA.  81 

latter  of  whom  used   the  following  emphatic 
language  :  — 

*(So  long  as  Cuba  remains  in  the  hands  of  Spain, 
—  a  friendly  Power,  a  Power  of  which  we  have  no 
dread,  —  it  should  continue  to  be,  as  it  has  been,  the 
policy  of  all  administrations  ever  since  I  have  been 
connected  with  the  Government,  to  let  Cuba  remain 
there  ;  but  with  the  fixed  determination,  which  I 
hope  never  will  be  relinquished,  that  if  Cuba  pass 
from  her,  it  shall  not  be  into  any  other  hands  but 
ours."  ^ 

The  acquisition  of  that  island  seemed  so 
desirable  to  President  Polk,  that  in  1848  he 
directed  our  Minister  at  Madrid  to  ascertain  if 
Spain  wasyivilling  to  transfer  the  same  to  the 
United  States  for  a  liberal  compensation ;  but 
the  Minister  of  State  replied  "  that  he  believed 
such  to  be  the  feeling  of  the  country  that, 
sooner  than  see  the  island  transferred  to  any 
Power,  they  would  prefer  seeing  it  sunk  in 
the  ocean.'\ 

In  1849  an  adventurer  named  Narcisco  Lopez 
made  preparations  in  this  country,  with  the 
design  of  attacking  the  island  of  Cuba;  but 
his  expedition  was  defeated  by  the  vigilance 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States.     He 

1  See  page  39. 
6 


82  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

subsequently  managed,  however,  to  elude  the 
United  States  authorities ;  as  two  more  expe- 
ditions fitted  out  by  him,  one  in  1850  and  the 
other  in  1851,  were  successful  so  far  as  a 
landing  on  the  island  was  concerned,  although 
otherwise  abortive.  The  popular  uprising  upon 
which  Lopez  had  built  his  hopes  of  the  success 
of  his  last  adventure  did  not  occur ;  his  forces 
were  routed,  and  he  himself  was  captured  and 
executed. 

The  intelligence  of  these  events  produced  a 
profound  sensation  in  Europe,  and  the  Govern- 
ments of  Great  Britain  and  France  were  at  once 
aroused.  Louis  Napoleon  was  now  President  of 
the  French  Republic ;  and  it  is  probable  that 
both  he  and  his  English  ally  not  only  viewed 
with  alarm  the  extension  of  our  national  terri- 
tory which  followed  the  successful  issue  of  the 
war  with  Mexico,  but  apprehended  that  these 
spasmodic  forays  of  Lopez  were  only  precur- 
sors of  an  organized  effort  on  the  part  of  this 
Government  for  the  seizure  and  annexation  of 
Cuba. 

Accordingly,  early  in  1852,  when  Mr.  Fill- 
more was  President  and  Mr.  Webster  Secretary 
of  State,  the  two  Governments  of  Great  Britain 
and  France  resorted  to  the  novel,  and  in  the 


CUBA.  83 

judgment  of  many  Americans  the  impertinent, 
procedure  of  proposing  to  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  that  the  three  Governments 
should  enter  into  a  certain  tripartite  arrange- 
ment relative  to  Cuba,  which  is  so  unusual  that 
we  give  it  entire.^ 

Preamble. 

Her  Majesty,  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom 
of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  the  Prince  President 
of  the  French  Republic,  and  the  United  States  of 
America,  having  judged  it  expedient,  with  a  view- 
to  strengthen  the  friendly  relations  which  happily 
subsist  between  them,  to  set  forth  and  fix,  by  a 
convention,  their  views  and  intentions  with  regard 
to  the  island  of  Cuba,  have  named  as  their  respec- 
tive plenipotentiaries  for  that  purpose  ;  that  is  to 
say,— 

Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain  and  Ire- 
land, etc.. 

The  Prince  President  of  the  French  Republic,  etc.. 

And  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica, etc.. 

Who,  after  having  communicated  to  each  other 
their  respective  full  powers,  found  in  good  and  due 
form,  have  agreed  upon  and  concluded  the  following 
articles :  — 

1  Correspondence  on  the  Proposed  Tripartite  Convention  rela- 
tive to  Cuba,  p.  13. 


84  .THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

Art.  I.  The  high  contracting  parties  hereby  sev- 
erally and  collectively  disclaim,  both  now  and  for 
hereafter,  all  intention  to  obtain  possession  of  the 
island  of  Cuba  ;  and  they  respectively  bind  them- 
selves to  discountenance  all  attempt  to  that  effect 
on  the  part  of  any  Power  or  individuals  what- 
ever. 

The  high  contracting  parties  declare,  severally  and 
collectively,  that  they  will  not  obtain  or  maintain, 
for  themselves,  or  for  any  one  of  themselves,  any  ex- 
clusive control  over  the  said  island,  nor  assume  nor 
exercise  any  dominion  over  the  same. 

Art.  II.   The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified, 

and  the  ratification  shall  be  exchanged  at ,  as 

soon  as  possible  within months  from  the  date 

thereof. 

In  witness  whereof,  the  respective  plenipotentia- 
ries have  signed  the  same,  and  have  affixed  thereto 
the  seals  of  their  arms. 

Done  at  Washington,  the day  of ,  in  the 

year  of  our  Lord  1852. 

It  will  thus  be  observed  that  the  two  foreign 
Governments  were  so  considerate  as  to  present 
to  the  United  States  a  form  of  a  treaty  which 
needed  only  the  signatures  of  the  respective 
plenipotentiaries  and  the  exchange  of  ratifica- 
tions, to  give  it  the  character  of  a  perpetual 
obligation. 


CUBA.  85 

The  Earl  of  Malmesbury,  in  his  letter  ^  of 
April  8,  1852,  to  Mr.  Crampton,  the  British 
Minister  at  Washington,  remarked  that  as  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  had  "  repeat- 
edly declared  that  it  would  not  see  with  indif- 
ference the  island  of  Cuba  fall  into  the  possession 
of  any  other  European  power  than  Spain,"  so 
her  Majesty's  Government  "could  never  see 
with  indifference  the  island  of  Cuba  in  the  pos- 
session of  any  Power  whatever  but  Spain." 
I  In  his  letter  to  Mr.  Webster  of  July  8,  1852, 
Mr.  Crampton  stated  the  true  motive  of  the 
Allied  Powers  when  he  said  that  the  nation 
possessing  Cuba  mi^/d  either  protect  or  obstruct  the 
commercial  routes  from  one  ocean  to  the  other  ^al- 
though he  added  that  Spain  was  put  to  great 
expense  in  keeping  an  armed  force  in  Cuba, 
and  that,  relieved  of  the  apprehension  which 
was  the  cause  of  these  armaments  (namely,  an- 
ticipated expeditions  from  the  United  States, 
like  those  of  Lopez),  she  could  more  easily  meet 
her  engagements  to  her  French  and  English 
creditor^  He  was  also  of  opinion  that  a  stipu- 
lation li¥e  the  foregoing  would  be  an  induce- 

^  The  communications  on  this  subject  hereinafter  referred  to 
will  be  found  in  "  Correspondence  on  the  Proposed  Tripartite 
Convention  relative  to  Cuba.'* 


86  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

ment  to  her  to  lower  her  tariff  at  Havana,  the 
high  rates  of  which  were  a  subject  of  complaint 
in  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Everett  was  Mr.  Webster's  successor  as 
Secretary  of  State.  In  a  communication  to  the 
Comte  de  Sartiges,  dated  Dec.  1, 1852,  he  stated 
with  remarkable  clearness  and  power  the  rea- 
sons of  the  declination  of  the  President  to  enter 
into  the  tripartite  arrangement. 

Th^y  were  substantially  as  follows  :  — 

1.  \The  President  fully  concurs  with  his  prede- 
cessors "that  the  United  States  could  not  see 
with  indifference  the  island  of  Cuba  fall  into 
the  possession  of  any  other  European  Govern- 
ment than  Spain.''  The  President  does  not  covet 
the  acquisition  of  Cuba  for  the  United  States ; 
at  the  same  time  he  considers  the  condition  of 
Cuba  as  mainly  an  American  question. 

2.  The  convention  proposed  would  be  viewed 
with  disfavor  by  the  United  States  Senate. 

3.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  would  allow  the  treaty- 
making  Power  to  impose  a  permanent  disability 
on  the  American  Government. 

4.  Among  the  oldest  traditions  of  the  Federal 
Government  is  an  aversion  to  political  alliances 
with  European  powers. 


CUBA.  87 

5.  The  compact,  although  equal  in  its  terms, 
would  be  very  unequal  in  substance.  France 
and  England,  by  entering  into  it,  would  disable 
themselves  from  obtaining  possession  of  an  island 
remote  from  their  seats  of  government,  belong- 
ing to  another  European  power,  while  the  United 
States  would  disable  themselves  from  making  an 
acquisition  which  might  take  place  without  any 
disturbance  of  existing  foreign  relations,  and 
in  the  natural  order  of  things.  The  island  of 
Cuba  lies  at  our  doors.  It  commands  the  ap- 
proach to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  which  washes  the 
shores  of  five  of  our  States.  It  bars  the  en- 
trance of  that  great  river  which  drains  half  the 
North  American  continent,  and,  with  its  tribu- 
taries, forms  the  largest  system  of  internal  water 
communication  in  the  world.  It  keeps  watch  at 
the  doorway  c^  our  intercourse  tdth  California  hy  the 
Isthmus  route,  \ 

But  any  designs  against  Cuba  on  the  part  of 
this  Government  are  emphatically  disclaimed ; 
and  the  President  has  given  ample  proof  of 
the  sincerity  with  which  he  holds  these  views 
by  throwing  the  whole  force  of  his  constitu- 
tional power  against  all  illegal  attacks  upon 
the  island. 

6.  The  proposed  convention  would  be  a  tran- 


88  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

sitory  arrangement,  sure  to  be  swept  away  by 
the  irresistible  tide  of  aiSairs  in  a  new  country. 
(To  illustrate  this  Mr.  Everett  refers  to  the  com- 
parative history  of  Europe  and  America  during 
the  preceding  century.  His  enlargement  upon 
the  material  development  of  this  country  is  ex- 
tremely graphic  and  powerful.) 

7.  The  conclusion  of  the  proposed  treaty 
would  not  put  an  end  to  the  attacks  made 
upon  Cuba  by  lawless  bands  of  adventurers 
from  the  United  States,  as  claimed  by  the  Brit- 
ash  Government,  but  would  give  a  new  im- 
ipulse  to  them.  It  would  strike  a  death-blow 
tt©  the  conservative  policy  hitherto  pursued  in 
this  country  toward  Cuba,  and  would  accom- 
plish the  overthrow  of  the  administration  en- 
tering into  it. 

The  communication,  of  which  the  above  is 
an  abstract,  is  regarded  by  many  as  one  of  the 
ablest  of  American  State  papers.  Lord  John 
Russell,  who  succeeded  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury 
in  the  British  foreign  office,  seems  to  have  been 
offended  by  Mr.  Everett's  glowing  picture  of 
our  national  expansion;  for  he  declared  in  a 
communication  to  Mr.  Cramp  ton  dated  Feb.  16, 
1853,  that  there  was  no  occasion  for  Mr.  Everett 
to  refer  to  events  with  which  the  two  foreign 


CUBA.  89 

Governments  were  already  familiar.  This  let- 
ter was  sent  after  Mr.  Everett's  retirement 
from  the  Department  of  State,  but  he  felt  that 
it  was  his  duty  to  answer  it  as  a  private  indi- 
vidual. His  reply,  dated  at  Boston  on  the  17th 
of  the  following  September,  is  an  able  vindica- 
tion of  the  arguments  contained  in  his  commu- 
nication in  the  preceding  December. 

With  the  falling  through  of  the  tripartite 
arrangement,  our  relations  with  Spain  grew 
less  friendly  than  ever.  The  Cuban  authori- 
ties manifested  an  ofi&cious  vigilance  in  sub- 
jecting American  citizens  to  frequent  acts  of 
annoyance  and  injury,  and  in  interfering  with 
American  commerce.  This  invasion  of  our  na- 
tional rights  culminated  in  the  seizure  by  the 
Cuban  authorities  of  the  American  steamer  the 
^'  Black  Warrior,"  in  the  latter  part  of  February, 
1854.  Deeming  the  purchase  of  the  island  by 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  as  the 
only  means  of  preventing  the  recurrence  of 
such  acts  of  violence.  President  Pierce  sent 
directions  to  Mr.  Soul^,  the  American  Min- 
ister at  Madrid,  to  meet  Messrs.  Buchanan 
and  Mason,  our  ministers  respectively  to  Great 
Britain  and  France,  "for  a  full  and  free  inter- 


90  THE   MONKOE   DOCTRINE. 

change  of  views  in  order  to  secure  a  concur- 
rence in  reference  to  the  general  object."  ^ 

The  three  ministers  met  at  Ostend  on  Oct.  9, 
1854,  and  drew  up  a  paper  known  as  the 
/  Ostend  Manifesto,  in  which  they  arrived  at 
the  conclusion  that  an  immediate  "  effort  ought 
to  be  made  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  to  purchase  Cuba  from  Spain  at  any 
price  for  which  it  can  be  obtained,  not  exceed- 
ing the  sum  of  $ ."      It  was  in  their  opinion 

advisable  that  the  proposal  should  be  presented 
through  the  necessary  diplomatic  forms  to  the 
Cortes  about  to  assemble.  However,  when  the 
question  came  up  for  discussion  in  that  body 
not  many  weeks  after,  the  declaration  of  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  that  in  his  judg- 
ment "  to  part  with  Cuba  would  be  to  part 
with  the  national  honor,"  was  not  only  franti- 
cally applauded  in  the  galleries,  but  received 
the  sanction  of  the  house. 

In  the  session  of  1858-1859  of  the  United 
States  Senate  a  bill  was  introduced  by  Mr. 
Slidell,  of  Louisiana,  providing  for  the  placing  of 
the  sum  of  thirty  million  dollars  in  the  hands 
of  the  President,  with  a  view  to  the  acquisition 

1  See  Executive  Documents,  2d  Session,  33d  Congress. 

2  Ibid. 


CUBA.  91 

of  Cuba.  An  animated  and  protracted  discus- 
sion ensued;  but  the  bill  was  eventually  with- 
drawn by  its  author.^ 

*  The  subsequent  differences  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Cuban  authorities  have  not  called  for  the  application  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  ;  but  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  a  reciprocity- 
treaty  between  this  countiy  and  Spain,  with  twenty-eight  articles 
and  three  comprehensive  tariff  schedules,  has  just  been  signed, 
and  is  now  (Jan.  29, 1885)  before  the  United  States  Senate  for 
ratification  or  rejection. 


92  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 


CHAPTER  YII. 

THE   FRENCH   INTERVENTION   IN   MEXICO. 

The  release  of  Mexico  from  the  dominion 
of  Spain  in  1821  brought  the  former  country 
more  than  ever  under  the  tyrannical  rule  of 
the  Church.  A  Liberal  party,  however,  soon 
sprang  up;  and  the  antagonisms  of  these  two 
parties  —  the  Church  and  the  Liberal  — gave 
rise  in  thirty-three  years  to  thirty-six  different 
forms  of  government.  From  1857  to  1861  the 
political  condition  of  Mexico  was  peculiarly 
disturbed.  The  triumph  of  the  Liberal  party 
in  1857  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  a  con- 
stitutional federal  government.  The  Church 
party  soon  set  aside  this  constitution  and  main- 
tained a  tottering  government,  which  fell  when 
President  Miramon  was  defeated  by  the  Liberal 
army  under  Juarez,  on  the  17th  of  November, 
1860. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  during 
these  three  years  of  discord  the  constitutional 
government  under  Juarez  continued  to  exist, 
although     the     Diplomatic    Corps    recognized 


UNIVERSITY 

THE   FRENCH   INTERVENTION    IN   MEXICO.       93 

the  insurrectionary  party  as  the   Government 
de  facto. 

Certain  enormities,  most  of.  which  were  com- 
mitted by  the  Church  party  prior  to  the  victory 
of  Juarez,  were  regarded  by  the  creditor  Gov- 
ernments of  Great  Britain,  Spain,  and  France 
as  sufficient  to  justify  an  armed  intervention  in 
Mexican  affairs. 

These,  for  convenience,  may  be  stated  as 
follows  :  — 

1.  (The  claim  of  England\ 

In  obedience  to  the  orders  of  Miramon,  whose 
party  was  in  pecuniary  embarrassment,  a  party 
of  armed  men  broke  into  the  house  of  the  Brit- 
ish legation  on  Nov.  16,  1860,  and  against  the 
protest  of  the  Spanish  Minister,  who  happened 
to  be  present,  and  in  spite  of  the  English  flag 
and  the  seals  of  the  office,  rifled  the  safes  of 
£152,000  sterling,  belonging  to  English  bond- 
holders, deposited  there  for  safe  keeping. 

In  this  connection  it  is  important  to  note  that 
a  writer  in  Eraser's  Magazine  of  December,  1861, 
states  that  prior  to  the  date  of  foreign  interven- 
tion grave  complaints  were  made  by  Mexicans 
that  merchants,  in  order  to  elude  payment  of 
the  high  rate  of  duty  on  the  exportation  of  sil- 
ver connived,  with  British  officers,  who,  for  a 


94  THE   MONKOE   DOCTRINE. 

compensation,  secreted  upon  their  persons  and 
carried  upon  board  the  war-ships  of  England 
great  loads  of  the  precious  metal.  Hence  he 
concludes  that  the  Mexican  generals,  "  in  at- 
tacking the  British  consulates,  were  probably 
actuated  rather  by  a  rude  theory  of  their  own 
on  the  subject  of  justifiable  reprisal,  than  by  a 
mere  senseless  hostility  to  foreigners  or  rapa- 
cious desire  for  plunder." 

The  above,  however,  was  England's  principal 
cause  of  complaint;  although  she  also  claimed 
that  Marquez,  the  coadjutor  of  Miramon,  on  the 
8th  of  April,  1859,  murdered,  among  others,  a 
surgeon  who  was  either  an  English  subject  or 
of  English  descent. 

2.Q[^he  claim  of  SpainX 

In  September,  1859,  the  insurrectionary  party 
concluded  a  treaty  with  Spain,  known  as  the 
Mon- Almonte  treaty,  which  recognized  the  va- 
lidity of  ^certain  claims  denied  by  the  consti- 
tutional government.  Upon  the  triumph  of 
Juarez  the  latter  government  disavowed  the 
treaty. 

This  was  Spain's  cardinal  ground  of  complaint, 
although  she  was  also  aggrieved  at  the  summary 
dismissal  by  Juarez  of  M.  Pacheco,  the  Spanish 
Ambassador. 


THE   FRENCH   INTERVENTION  IN   MEXICO.       95 

3.  (The  claim  of  France\ 

Jecfeer,  an  embarrassed  Swiss  banker,  and 
Miramon  designed  a  means  of  mutual  enrich- 
ment, which  was  formulated  on  the  29th  of 
October,  1859,  in  a  decree  in  the  name  of  the 
insurrectionary  administration  creating  an  issue 
of  bonds  to  the  amount  of  $15,000,000,  which 
was  only  calculated  to  raise  the  comparatively 
paltry  sum  of  $750,000.  Without  entering 
into  the  details  of  this  financial  measure,  let  it 
suffice  to  say  that  upon  the  failure  of  Jecker, 
in  May,  1860,  the  bonds  passed  into  the  hands 
of  his  creditors. 

France  was  likewise  prompted  to  interfere,  in 
order  to  seek  redress  for  her  alleged  (and  prob- 
ably largely  fraudulent)  claim  of  $12,000,000, 
on  account  of  certain  wrongs  committed  by 
Mexico  up  to  the  year  1861. 

While,  therefore,  the  foreign  creditors  main- 
tained that  international  obligations  must  be  as- 
sumed by  the  successive  governments  of  a  state, 
the  constitutional  party  claimed  that  the  admin- 
istration of  Miramon  was  in  no  sense  a  govern- 
ment, but  only  an  unsuccessful  insurrection. 

The  way  for  foreign  intervention  was  proba- 
bly prepared  by  Miramon,  Almonte,  and  other 
members  of  the  Church  party,  who  were  anxious 


96  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

that  that  party  should  regain  some  of  the 
wealth  and  privileges  of  which  it  had  been 
deprived  by  the  constitutional  government. 
Accordingly  they  were  active  in  creating  the 
belief  abroad  that  Mexico  was  neither  capable 
of  self-government  nor  adapted  to  republican 
institutions. 

The  three  Powers  signed  a  convention  in 
London,  in  October,  1861,  the  following  article 
of  which  is  important :  — 

"  Art.  II.  ^he  high  contracting  parties  engage 
not  to  seek  for  themselve^  in  the  employment  of  the 
coercive  measures  contemplated  by  the  present  Con- 
vention, ^sny  acquisition  of  territoryj  nor  any  special 
advantage,  and  not  to  exercise  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  Mexico  any  influence  of  a  nature  to  prejudice 
the  right  of  the  Mexican  nation  to  choose  and  to 
constitute  freely  the  form  of  its  government."  ^ 

They  further  agreed  \fo  simply  demand  -their 
debts,  \nd  if  payment  was  refused,  to  take 
possession  of  Mexican  ports  and  sequestrate 
the  customs  towards  the  liquidation  of  their 
claims. 

I  It  is  unnecessary  to  dwell  upon  subsequent 
ents.     Hardly  had   the  troops  of  the  Allied 

*  See  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1861,  p.  467. 


THE   FKENCH   INTERVENTION  IN   MEXICO.      97 

Powers  disembarked  at  Vera  Cruz,  when  the 
designs  of  the  unscrupulous  Emperor  of  the 
French  were  disclosed.  England  and  Spain 
indignantly  withdrew,  and  Napoleon  III.  was 
thus  left  unrestrained  to  accomplish  his  pur- 
pose, long  but  covertly  entertained,  of  plac- 
ing an  Austrian  prince  upon  the  Mexican 
throne.  1 

Our  interest  in  the  invasion  centres  in  the 
attitude  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
from  the  announcement  of  the  intentions  of  the 
foreign  Powers  to  the  ultimate  withdrawal  of 
the  forces  of  Napoleon,  i  It  is  the  common  opin- 
ion that  the  Emperor  would  never  have  com- 
mitted himself  to  this  unfortunate  undertaking, 
had  he  not  entertained  the  idea  that  the  dis- 
solution of  the  American  Union  had  already 
begun?\  He  was  thus  relieved  of  all  fear  of  in- 
terference on  the  part  of  this  Government,  as 
its  available  resources  were  employed  in  the 
attempt  to  suppress  the  insurrection  in  the 
South. 

That  this  Government,  however,  even  in  its 
crippled  condition,  was  unchanged  in  its  adher- 
ence to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  appears  from  the 
following  considerations :  — 


98  THE   MONKOE   DOCTRINE. 

LylVom  the  moment  when  intervention  seemed  proh- 
ahle,  explanations  were  demanded  of  France^  and 
the  assurance  was  given  that  her  sok  purpose  was 
the  enforcement  of  the  claims  of  the  subjects  of  the 


Emperor  \ 


The  first  communication  was  from  M.  Thou- 
venel  to  Mr.  Dayton,  the  American  Minister 
in  Paris,  in  the  fall  of  1861,  to  the  effect  that 
"whatever  England  and  France  might  do,  it 
would  be  done  in  reference  to  realizing  their 
money  debt  only." 

This  avowal  was  followed  by  another  equally 
positive  and  plain.  On  June  5,  1862,  Mr.  Day- 
ton wrote  to  Mr.  Seward  that  M.  Thouvenel  had 
again  assured  him  in  regard  to  Mexico,  "  that 
'the  French  troops  did  not  go  there  to  interfere 
with  the  form  of  government,  nor  to  acquire 
an  inch  of  territory,  nor  remain  indefinitely  in 
the  country.  All  France  sought  was,  that  her 
existing  ^griefs'  should  be  settled,  and  some 
government  established  which  other  countries 
could  treat  with,  and  which  would  protect  their 
commercial  agents."  ^ 

Mr.  Seward,  on  Aug.  23,  1862,  wrote  to  Mr. 
Dayton :  "  This  Government,  relying  on  the 
explanations  which  have  been  made  by  France, 

1  Foreign  AfEairs,  1862,  p.  348. 


THE   FRENCH   INTERVENTION   IN  MEXICO.      99 

regards  the  conflict  as  a  war  involving  claims 
by  France  which  Mexico  has  failed  to  adjust  to 
the  satisfaction  of  her  adversary,  and  it  avoids 
intervention  between  the  belligerents."  ^ 

The  perfidy  of  Napoleon  is  apparent  from  the 
letter  which  he  addressed  to  General  Forey  upon 
his  assuming  command  of  the  French  forces  soon 
after  the  landing  at  Vera  Cruz :  — 

"  It  is  our  interest  that  the  United  States  shall 
be  powerful  and  prosperous,  but  it  is  not  at  all  to 
our  interest  that  she  should  grasp  the  whole  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  rule  thence  the  Antilles  as  well  as  South 
America,  and  be  the  sole  dispenser  of  the  products 
of  the  New  World.  ...  If,  on  the  contrary,  Mexico 
preserves  its  independence  and  maintains  the  integ- 
rity of  its  territory,  if  a  stable  government  be  there 
established  with  the  aid  of  France,  we  shall  have  re- 
stored to  the  Latin  race  on  the  other  side  of  the  ocean 
its  force  and  prestige,''''  ^ 

2\l)uring  the  entire  period  of  the  French  occupa- 
tion  ojMexico  the  Government  of  the  Umted  States 
recognised  only  the  Government  of  Juarez.) 

Upon  the  acceptance  by  Maximilian  of  the 
Mexican  throne  in  the  summer  of  1863,  Napo- 
leon saw  that  the  pacification  of  the  country 

1  Foreign  AfEairs,  1862,  p.  377. 

2  See  North  American  Review,  vol.  ciii.  p.  106. 


100  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

could  be  more  easily  achieved  if  the  new  Gov- 
ernment should  be  immediately  recognized  by 
that  of  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Seward  stated  in  his  letter  of  Sept.  26, 
1863,  to  Mr.  Dayton,  that  while  the  United 
States  had  "  neither  the  right  nor  the  disposi- 
tion to  intervene  by  force  on  either  side  in 
the  lamentable  war  which  is  going  on  between 
France  and  Mexico/'  yet  it  knew  well  that 
the  normal  opinion  of  the  people  of  Mexico, 
influenced  by  popular  opinion  in  this  country, 
"  favors  a  government  there  republican  in  form 
and  domestic  in  its  organization;"  and  that  in 
the  view  of  the  President  "this  popular  opin- 
ion of  the  United  States  is  just  in  itself,  and 
eminently  essential  to  the  progress  of  civiliza- 
tion on  the  American  continent."  He  then 
remarked  with  great  plainness,  "  that  if  France 
should,  upon  due  consideration,  determine  to 
adopt  a  policy  in  Mexico  adverse  to  the  Amer- 
can  opinions  and  sentiments  which  I  have  de- 
scribed, that  policy  would  probably  scatter 
seeds  which  would  be  fruitful  of  jealousies 
which  might  ultimately  ripen  into  collision 
between  France  and  the  United  States  and 
the  other  American  republics."  ^ 

1  Foreign  Affairs,  1863,  p.  709. 


THE   FRENCH   INTERVENTION   IN   MEXICO.     101 

Still  later,  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Dayton,  of 
October  23,  after  referring  to  the  fact  that 
M.  Drouyn  de  THuys  (who  succeeded  M.  Thou- 
venel  as  Foreign  Minister)  had  intimated  that 
an  early  acknowledgment  of  the  proposed  em- 
pire of  Maximilian  by  the  United  States  would 
be  convenient  to  France,  Mr.  Seward  stated, 
"  that  M.  Drouyn  de  I'Huys  should  be  informed 
that  the  United  States  continue  to  regard 
Mexico  as  the  theatre  of  a  war  which  has  not 
yet  ended  in  the  subversion  of  the  Government 
long  existing  there,  with  which  the  United 
States  remain  in  the  relation  of  peace  and 
sincere  friendship  ;  and  that,  for  this  reason,  the 
United  States  are  not  now  at  liberty  to  consider 
the  question  of  recognizing  a  government  which 
in  the  further  chances  of  war  may  come  into 
its  place.  The  United  States  consistently  with 
their  principles  can  do  no  otherwise  than  leave 
the  destinies  of  Mexico  in  the  keeping  of  her 
own  people,  and  recognize  their  sovereignty 
and  independence  in  whatever  form  they  them- 
selves shall  choose  that  this  sovereignty  and 
independence  shall  be  manifested."^ 

In  the  mean  time  the  attitude  of  the  Em- 
peror gave   rise   to   warm   discussions   in    the 

1  Foreign  Affairs,  186^  p.  726. 


102  THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

Congress  of  the  United  States.  On  Feb.  3, 
1863,  Mr.  McDougall,  of  California,  in  the  Senate 
denounced  "the  proceedings  of  France  as  the 
most  flagrant  robber  outrage  that  has  been  at- 
tempted by  any  modern  civilized  State." -^  And 
on  April  4,  1864,  a  little  less  than  two  months 
before  the  landing  of  Maximilian  at  Vera  Cruz, 
the  joint  resolution  relative  to  Mexican  affairs 
was  passed  by  the  National  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives without  a  dissenting  voice.  It  de- 
clared that  "  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
are  unwilling  by  silence  to  have  the  nations  of 
the  world  under  the  impression  that  they  are 
indifferent  spectators  of  the  deplorable  events 
now  transpiring  in  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  and 
that  they  therefore  think  fit  to  declare  that  it 
does  not  accord  with  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  to  acknowledge  any  monarchical  gov- 
ernment erected  on  the  ruins  of  any  republi- 
can government  in  America  under  the  auspices 
of  any  European  power."^  Mr.  Davis,  of  Mary- 
land, stated  as  the  policy  of  the  administration, 
"  to  cultivate  friendship  with  our  republican 
brethren  of  Mexico  and  South  America,  to  aid 

1  Congressional  Globe,  37th  Congress,  3d  Session;  Appendix, 
p.  94. 

2  Ibid.,  38th  Congress,  1st  Session,  p.  1408. 


THE   FRENCH    INTERVENTION   IN   MEXICO.      103 

in  consolidating  republican  principles,  to  retain 
popular  government  in  all  this  continent  from 
the  fangs  of  monarchical  or  aristocratic  power, 
and  to  lead  the  sisterhood  of  American  republics 
in  the  paths  of  peace,  prosperity,  and  power."  ^ 

The  passage  of  this  resolution  and  the  debate 
thereon  produced  great  excitement  in  France, 
and  war  actually  seemed  imminent.  When 
Mr.  Dayton  visited  M.  Drouyn  de  I'Huys  at  the 
Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  on  April  21,  the 
first  words  of  the  latter  were,  "  Do  you  bring  us 
peace,  or  bring  us  war  ?  "  However,  President 
Lincoln  was  wisely  conservative,  and  Mr.  Day- 
ton quieted  the  apprehensions  of  the  French 
Minister  by  reading  his  instructions  from  Mr. 
Seward.  These  were  frank  and  explicit,  and 
concluded  with  the  statement  "that  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  House  of  Eepresentatives  were 
adopted  upon  suggestions  arising  within  itself, 
and  not  upon  any  communication  of  the  ex- 
ecutive department,  and  that  the  French  Gov- 
ernment would  be  seasonably  apprised  of  any 
change  of  policy  upon  this  subject  which  the 
President  might  at  any  future  time  think  it 
proper  to  adopt. 


»2 


i  Congressional  Globe,  38th  Congress,  Ist  Session,  p.  1408. 
2  See  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1864,  p.  528. 


104  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

^X^ter  the  termination  of  the  Civil  War  in  the 
United  States,  the  Government  at  Washington  was 
more  pronounced  than  ever  in  warning  the  Govern- 
ment of  France  of  the  consequences  likely  to  follow 
the  prolonged  stay  of  the  French  troops  in  Mexico\ 

It  is  true  that  Mr.  Bigelow,  who  succeeded 
Mr.  Dayton  as  Minister  to  France,  stated  that 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  would 
recognize  the  empire  of  MaximiHan  upon  the 
immediate  withdrawal  of  the  French  troops 
from  the  territory  of  Mexico.  But  this  state- 
ment, made  upon  his  own  authority,  was  dis- 
approved by  the  President.  The  Government 
of  the  United  States  was  determined  that  the 
withdrawal  of  the  French  troops  should  de- 
pend upon  no  condition  precedent.  Accord- 
ingly Mr.  Seward  boldly  declared  the  wishes 
and  intentions  of  his  Government.  The  diplo- 
matic correspondence  upon  this  subject  is  too 
voluminous  to  quote  entire ;  but  the  following 
extract  from  a  communication  of  Mr.  Seward 
to  Mr.  Dayton,  dated  Dec.  16,  1865,  leaves 
nothing  to  be  desired  by  way  of  plainness  and 
candor : — 

"  It  has  been  the  President's  purpose  that  France 
should  be  respectfully  informed  upon  two  points; 
namely :  — 


THE   FRENCH   INTERVENTION   IN   MEXICO.      105 

''First.  That  the  United  States  earnestly  desire 
to  continue  and  to  cultivate  sincere  friendship  with 
France.         ^ 

"  Second,  ijhat  this  policy  would  be  brought  into 
imminent  jeopardy  unless  France  could  deem  it  con- 
sistent with  her  interest  and  honor  to  desist  from  the 
prosecution  of  armed  intervention  in  Mexico,  to  over- 
throw the  domestic  republican  government  existing 
there,  and  to  establish  upon  its  ruins  the  foreign 
monarchy  which  has  been  attempted  to  be  inaugu- 
rated in  the  capital  of  that  country.'*^ 

\After  further  correspondence  it  was  officially 
announced  on  the  5th  of  April,  1866,  that  the 
French  troops  should  evacuate  Mexico ;  and  in 
a  little  less  than  a  year  from  that  date  they  had 
all  departed.  It  is  generally  believed,  at  least 
in  this  country,  that  this  determination  of  the 
Emperor  was  largely  due  to  the  presence  of 
General  Sheridan  on  our  southwestern  frontier 
with  a  large  detachment  of  the  army  placed 
in  the  field  by  the  order  of  Congress  for  the 
national  defence?\ 

In  conclusion,  it  is  proper  to  remark  that 
during  this  period  the  agitation  of  this  subject 
in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  continued. 

1  See  Foreign  Relations,  1865  ;j  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1865, 
p.  321. 


106  THE   MONROE   DOCTKINE. 

Numerous  resolutions  were  offered,  especially 
in  the  House  of  Representatives,  denouncing 
the  conduct  of  the  Emperor ;  and  it  was  even 
proposed  to  aid  the  republicans  of  Mexico  by 
a  substantial  national  loan. 

\The  sentiment  of  many  Europeans  upon  the 
French  occupation  of  Mexico  found  expression 
in  the  remark  of  a  writer  in  the  "  London  Times '' 
in  1862,  that  the  Emperor  Napoleon  had  done 
a  great  political  service  to  the  world  "  in  con- 
firming the  previous  actions,  of  Spain  in  e:vtin' 
guishing  the  Monroe  Doctrine,\  A  similar  view 
was  entertained  by  a  writer  m  the  "  Westmin- 
ster Review''  of  October,  1863,  who  asserted 
that  "  the  occupation  of  Mexico  is  the  extinc- 
tion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  That  doctrine, 
it  must  be  owned,  is  both  absurd  and  arrogant 
in  theory  and  in  practice."  \^ut  that  there 
were  Europeans  candid  enough  to  admit  that 
the  policy  of  this  Government  was  consistent 
with  its  previous  adherence  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  appears  from  the  following  impar- 
tial statement  of  Sir  Edward  S.  Creasy :  — 

"  The  United  States  (occupied  by  their  own  Civil 
War  which  was  then  raging)  did  not  actually 
send  troops  to  oppose  the  French  in  Mexico,  but 


THE   FRENCH   INTERVENTION   IN  MEXICO.     107 

they  steadily  refused  to  recognize  Maximilian,  or 
any  government  except  a  republican  government, 
in  Mexico;  and  the  language  of  their  statesmen 
exhibited  the  fullest  development  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.""^ 

1  Fitst  Platform  of  International  Law,  p.  122. 


108  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

AMERICA   NORTH   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES. 

This  subject  is  naturally  treated  in  two  di- 
visions :  — 

1.  The  disputed  territory/  in  the  northwest.  —  We 
have  already  seen  that  this  dispute  largely  influ- 
enced President  Monroe  to  declare  his  interdic- 
tion of  further  European  colonization  upon  this 
continent;^  but  the  subject  should  not  be  dis- 
missed without  brief  reference  to  the  other  parti- 
cipants in  the  controversy,  and  to  the  peaceable 
adjustment  of  their  long-standing  differences. 

The  Spaniards  early  navigated  the  Pacific, 
and  sent  exploring  parties  northward  along  the 
line  of  the  coast.  They  claimed  by  discovery 
in  1774  Nootka  Sound,  so  called,  on  the  west- 
ern shore  of  Vancouver's  Island;  and  in  1789 
a  Spanish  expedition  seized  several  English 
vessels  moored  there.  The  British  Government 
at  once  assumed  a  hostile  attitude  and  demanded 
reparation.  The  differences  of  the  two  Powers 
were  settled  by  a  treaty  dated  Oct.  28,  1790; 

1  See  pages  12-16. 


AMEEICA   NORTH   OF   THE   XJNITED   STATES.    109 

the  terms  of  which  chiefly  applied  to  questions 
of  navigation  and  fishery,  and  to  trade  with 
the  natives,  and  did  not  determine  the  rights 
of  either  party  to  the  sovereignty  of  any  por- 
tion of  America.^ 

By  the  Florida  Treaty  of  Feb.  22,  1819,  be- 
tween Spain  and  the  United  States,  his  catholic 
Majesty  ceded  to  the  United  States  "  all  his 
rights,  claims,  and  pretensions  to  any  territo- 
ries "  north  of  the  42d  parallel  of  latitude ;  so 
that  Spain  at  once  retired  as  a  claimant  to  any 
territory  north  of  that  line. 

The  pretensions  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  to  the  disputed  territory  were  so 
indefinite  that  neither  could  possess  a  perfect 
title  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  same.  Hence 
a  treaty  was  signed  on  Oct.  20,  1818,  by 
the  provisions  of  the  third  article  of  which  all 
the  territories  claimed  by  both  parties,  west 
of  the  Kocky  Mountains,  were  left  free  and 
open  to  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  both  na- 
tions for  two  years ;  and  by  the  convention  of 
Aug.  6,  1827,  those  provisions  were  extended 
for  an  indefinite   period,  either  party  to  give 

*  For  all  the  teeaties  referred  to  in  this  chapter  which  were 
negotiated  before  1845,  see  Greenhow's  "  History  of  Oregon 
and  California  and  the  other  Northwestern  Territories." 


110  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

twelve  months'  notice  to  the  other  of  its  inten- 
tion to  annul  and  abrogate  the  same.  Finally, 
by  the  treaty  of  June  15,  1846,  the  49th 
parallel  of  north  latitude  was  fixed  as  the 
dividing"  line,  England  renouncing  all  claim  to 
the  territory  south  t^ereof.^ 

Early  in  the  present  century  a  misunderstand- 
ing arose  between  Russia  and  the  United  States 
in  regard  to  the  trade  carried  on  by  citizens  of 
the  latter  with  natives  of  the  North  Pacific 
coast.  In  1809,  soon  after  diplomatic  relations 
were  established  between  the  two  nations,  a 
desire  was  expressed  by  the  Government  of 
Russia  for  the  adoption  of  some  arrangement 
looking  to  a  discontinuance  of  differences ;  but 
the  correspondence  terminated  at  once  when 
it  appeared  that  the  Russian  American  Com- 
pany claimed  the  entire  coast  from  Behring's  Strait 
southward  to  and  beyond  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia 
River. 

The  historic  incidents  related  above,  espe- 
cially down  to  and  including  the  treaties  of  the 
United  States  with  Great  Britain  in  1818  and 
with  Spain  in  1819,  are  important  in  their 
bearing  upon  the  validity  of  the  claim  of  the 
United  States   to   territory   which   Russia  also 

1  See  Public  Treaties,  1875,  p.  320. 


AMERICA   NORTH    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES.    Ill 

claimed  as  her  own.  On  the  16th  of  September, 
1821,  the  Emperor  of  Eussia  issued  an  ukase, 
or  edict,  relative  to  trade  on  the  northwest  coast 
of  America,  accompanied  by  sixty-three  rules 
establishing  the  boundaries  for  navigation  along 
the  coast  and  the  order  of  naval  communication. 
In  these  articles  Russia  asserted  a  territorial 
claim  extending  to  the  51st  degree  of  north 
latitude,  and  interdicted  to  all  commercial  ves- 
sels other  than  Russian,  upon  the  penalty  of 
seizure  and  confiscation,  the  approach  upon  the 
high  seas  within  one  hundred  Italian  miles  of 
the  shores  to  which  that  claim  was  made  to 
apply.^ 

The  Governments  of  both  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  were  emphatic  in  the  expres- 
sion of  dissent.  A  correspondence  was  at  once 
begun  between  Mr.  Adams,  then  Secretary  of 
State,  and  the  Chevalier  de  Poletica,  the  former 
denying  the  claim  of  Russia,  and  the  latter 
asserting  it  upon  the  grounds  "  of  first  discov- 
ery, first  occupation,  and  upon  that  which 
results  from  a  peaceable  and  uncontested  pos- 
session of  more  than  half  a  century." 

The   discontinuance   of   this   correspondence 

1  See  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1821,  1822,  p.  472, 
et  seq. 


112  THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE. 

was  the  simple  admission  of  an  inability  to 
agree.  The  United  States  did  not  abate  one 
iota  of  their  demands,  and  in  July,  1823,  Mr. 
Adams  made  the  remark  to  Baron  Tuyl  already 
referred  to,  that  we  should  contest  the  Russian 
territorial  establishments  on  this  continent,  and 
that  no  new  European  colonial  estahlishments  on 
this  continent  would  he  allowed} 

A  few  months  after,  on  December  2,  came  the 
declaration  of  President  Monroe  in  his  annual 
message,  to  the  effect  that  while  the  differences 
with  Russia  and  Great  Britain  as  to  the  north- 
western territory  were  likely  to  be  settled  by 
amicable  negotiation,  the  occasion  was  an  appro- 
priate one  to  declare  that  the  American  con- 
tinents "  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered 
as  subjects  for  colonization  by  any  European 
powers."  ^ 

This  declaration  evoked  from  the  Govern- 
ments of  Great  Britain  and  Russia  a  decided 
protest;  and  it  was  regarded  by  many  as  pre- 
mature, in  that  it  defeated  the  arrangement 
already  proposed  for  a  joint  convention  between 
the  three  nations  having  claims  to  the  disputed 
territory.^     However,  by  separate  conventions, 

1  See  page  13.  2  gee  page  16. 

»  See  Remarks  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  on  p.  41. 


AMERICA  NORTH   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.    113 

one  between  the  United  States  and  Eussia, 
signed  at  St.  Petersburg  on  the  Vn  of  April, 

1824,  and  the  other  between  Great  Britain  and 
Russia,  signed   at   the    same    place,   Feb.  ^728? 

1825,  the  southern  boundary  of  the  Russian 
possessions  was  finally  agreed  upon  and  deter- 
mined. Forty  years  after,  when  the  ratification 
of  the  treaty^  whereby  these  possessions  were 
to  be  conveyed  to  the  United  States  was  under 
discussion  in  the  United  States  Senate,  Mr. 
Sumner  remarked  that  by  it  "  we  dismiss  one 
other  monarch  from  the  continent.  One  by 
one  they  have  retired ;  first  France ;  then 
Spain ;  then  France  again ;  and  now  Russia ; 
all  giving  way  to  the  absorbing  Unity  declared 
in  the  national  motto,  E  Plurihus  TJnum!^  ^ 

2.  Canada,  —  In  1837  and  1838  an  insurrec- 
tion of  a  serious  nature  broke  out  in  Canada. 
This  was  the  occasion  of  the  sending  of  Lord 
Durham  to  the  revolting  provinces,  whose 
efforts  at  reorganization  are  so  graphically  por- 
trayed by  Mr.  Justin  McCarthy.^  There  was 
some  discussion  in  this  country  as  to  the  appli- 
cation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  but  the  only 
real  difference  with  the  British  authorities  was 

1  Public  Treaties,  1875,  p.  671.  2  Works,  xi.  223. 

8  A  History  of  Our  Own  Times,  vol.  i.  chap.  iii. 
8 


114  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

in  relation  to  the  capture  and  destruction  of 
the  steamboat  '^Caroline/'  which  was  employed 
upon  the  St.  Lawrence  by  Canadian  insurgents 
in  carrying  passengers  and  munitions  of  war 
from  the  American  to  the  Canadian  shore. 
Lord  Ashburton  in  behalf  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment made  a  satisfactory  acknowledgment, 
and  the  matter  ended.^ 

The  conflicts  between  Upper  and  Lower  Can- 
ada about  twenty  years  ago  suggested  the  idea 
of  a  legislative  union  between  the  various  Brit- 
ish North  American  colonies.  It  is  thought  that 
the  termination  of  our  Civil  War  by  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  insurrection  in  the  Southern  States 
also  demonstrated  to  the  Canadian  people  the 
practical  advantages  of  such  a  union.  At  any 
rate,  the  union  was  effected  by  the  Imperial 
act  known  as  "  the  British  North  American 
Act,  1867;"  and  under  the  name  of  the  Domin- 
ion of  Canada  were  included  Upper  and  Lower 
Canada  (now  called  Ontario  and  Quebec),  Nova 
Scotia,  New  Brunswick,  Prince  Edward  Island, 
Manitoba,  and  British  Columbia.    / 

It  was  maintained  by  many  that  this  consoli- 
dation was  in  derogation  of  the  spirit  of  the 

1  Woolsey's  International  Law,  §  163. 


AMERICA   NORTH   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.    115 

Monroe  Doctrine ;  and  a  resolution  was  intro- 
duced in  the  House  of  Representatives,  —  but 
never  put  to  a  vote,  —  declaring  the  uneasiness 
of  this  country  in  the  contemplation  of  "  such 
a  vast  conglomeration  of  American  States  es- 
tablished on  the  monarchical  principle,  such  a 
proceeding  being  in  contravention  of  the  tra- 
ditionary and  constantly  declared  principles  of 
the  United  States,  and  endangering  their  most 
important  interests."  ^ 

1  See  Creasy's  First  Platform,  p.  121. 


116  THE  MONKOE   DOCTRINE. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

MINOR  OCCASIONS  ON  WHICH  THE  DOCTRINE   HAS 
BEEN   APPLIED. 

The  following  are  occasions  which  called  forth 
little  if  any  legislative  discussion,  but  in  which 
the  Doctrine  seems  to  have  been  applied  from 
what  might  be  termed  a  popular  stand-point. 

1.  The  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States.  — 
The  independence  of  the  Republic  of  Texas  was 
acknowledged  by  the  United  States  in  1837,  by 
France  in  1839,  and  by  England,  Holland,  and 
Belgium  in  1840.  Mexico,  however,  did  not 
relinquish  her  hopes  of  resubjugation ;  hence 
the  final  annexation  of  the  republic  to  the 
United  States,  in  1845,  gave  rise  to  the  war  of 
Mexico  with  this  country,  commonly  called  the 
Mexican  War. 

The  Northern  opposition  to  the  admission  of 
Texas  into  the  Union  was  due  to  a  deep-seated 
aversion  to  the  extension  of  slavery;  but  there 
was  an  argument  at  that  time  in  favor  of  the 
admission   which   naturally    received   a   strong 


THE   DOCTRIKE  APPLIED.  117 

popular  support.  It  was  this ;  there  was  an 
apprehended  danger  of  an  infringement  of  the 
principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  Great 
Britain  and  France  made  no  secret  of  their 
desire  to  see  Texas  under  an  English  or  a 
joint  protectorate  without  slavery,  and  free 
from  the  control  of  the  United  States. 

2.  The  Spanish  Invasion  of  Santo  Domingo,  — 
Santo  Domingo,  or  the  Dominican  Republic, 
comprising  the  eastern  portion  of  the  island 
of  Hayti,  declared  its  independence  in  1844. 
Disorders  continued  until  1861,  when  Pedro 
San  tana,  a  prominent  political  character,  dis- 
heartened with  the  condition  of  affairs,  invited 
Spain  to  resume  dominion  over  the  island. 
The  Dominicans  kept  up  a  guerilla  warfare, 
which,  aided  by  the  malarious  climate  and 
the  irregular  character  of  the  country,  proved 
very  destructive  to  the  Spanish  troops.  An 
appeal  was  made  by  the  Dominicans  to  the 
United  States  and  the  other  American  repub- 
lics for  aid  ;  but,  occupied  with  the  war  with 
the  South,  the  Government  and  people  of  this 
country  could  only  offer  their  sympathy. 

Convinced  that  the  subjugation  of  the  island 
could  be  attained  only  by  the  loss  of  blood  and 
treasure,  the  Spanish  Government  determined 


118  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

upon  its  abandonment.  In  July,  1865,  the 
Spanish  Governor-General  insisted  that  as  a 
condition  precedent  to  his  retirement,  the  Do- 
minican Government  should  record  a  national 
declaration  that  the  war  which  Spain  had  been 
waging  was  just  and  lawful,  and  that  Spain 
withdrew,  out  of  "  respect  to  the  preference  of 
the  Dominican  people  for  an  independent  nation- 
aUty."  The  Governor-General  was  compelled 
to  recede  from  this  position,  but  not  until  he 
had  been  informed  by  one  of  the  Dominican 
commissioners  that  "  the  united  Dominican  peo- 
ple, without  regard  to  rank  or  color,  had  planted 
the  white  cross  of  the  republic  on  the  principle 
enunciated  hy  the  Great  Mother  of  free  nations^  that 
America  hehngs  to  Americans,  and  we  will  endure  all 
our  trials  over  again  sooner  than  desert  itr  ^ 

3.  The  war  of  Spain  with  Peru  and  Chili.  — 
Differences  growing  out  of  claims  of  Spanish 
residents  of  Peru  against  that  country  resulted 
in  the  forcible  seizure  by  Spain  in  March,  1864, 
of  the  guano-yielding  Chincha  Islands.  •  Great 
indignation  was  expressed  not  only  by  Peru- 
vians but  by  all  foreigners  resident  in  Peru  ; 
and  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  residing 
at  Lima  and   Callao  met  April  27  and  passed 

^  See  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1865,  p.  754. 


THE   DOCTRINE   APPLIED.  119 

six  resolutions  emphatically  affirming  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  declaring  that 
in  the  recognition  of  that  doctrine  "  consists  the 
safeguard  and  only  defence  of  the  sister  repub- 
lics of  this  continent."  ^ 

Early  in  1865  a  treaty  was  signed  by  the 
belligerents,  which  was  afterward  repudiated 
by  Peru.  Thereupon  the  republics  of  Bolivia, 
Chili,  and  Ecuador  formed  a  defensive  alliance 
with  Peru,  and  on  March  31,  1866,  the  Span- 
ish fleet  bombarded  Valparaiso.  This  was  suc- 
ceeded by  only  a  nominal  continuance  of  the 
war;  and  on  April  12,  1871,  a  peace  confer- 
ence was  held  at  Washington  under  the  presi- 
dency of  Mr.  Hamilton  Fish,  our  Secretary  of 
State.  Its  deliberations  resulted  in  a  conven- 
tion which  was  signed  by  Mr.  Fish  as  well  as 
by  the  representatives  of  the  other  Powers, 
and  in  which  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  played  an  important  part,  as  appears  by 
the  first  two  articles. 

"AJEiT.  1.  By  this  convention  the  suspension  of 
hostilities  existing  de  facto  between  Spain  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  allied  republics  of  Bolivia,  Chili,  Peru, 
and  Ecuador  on  the  other,  is  changed  into  an  armis- 
tice, or  general  truce. 

1  See  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1864,  p.  654. 


120  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

"Art.  2.  This  armistice  shall  last  indefinitely, 
and  it  cannot  be  broken  by  any  of  the  belligerents 
until  three  years  after  express  and  explicit  notifica- 
tion shall  have  been  given  by  one  to  the  other  of 
the  intention  to  renew  hostilities.  In  this  case  such 
notification  must  he  made  through  the  Grovernment  of 
the  United  States. ^^  ^ 

4.  The  War  of  Chili  with  Peru  and  Bolivia. — 
This  recent  contest  has  only  partially  called 
for  an  application  ofj;  the  Monroe  Doctrine ; 
but  much  has  been  said  about  its  probable  re- 
currence,—  a  subject  to  which  Mr.  Albert  G. 
Browne,  Jr.,  has  adverted  in  his  able  paper 
upon  "  The  Growing  Power  of  the  Republic  of 
Chili."  2 

It  was  feared  that  the  annexation  of  the 
nitrate-bearing  provinces  of  Peru  to  Chili  might 

1  See  Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1871,  p.  706.  The  interest  of  the 
United  States  in  the  affairs  of  the  Southern  republics  is  further 
shown  by  their  mediatorial  services  in  relation  to  the  boundary 
dispute  of  Chili  with  the  Argentine  Republic.  This  vexed  ques- 
tion was  settled  by  treaty  dated  Oct.  2,  1881.  In  referring  to 
the  subject  in  his  message  to  the  Congress  of  the  Argentine 
Republic  in  May,  1882,  President  Rocas  said:  "I  must  not 
omit  to  remind  you  of  the  names  of  the  distinguished  ministers 
plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  in  Chili  and  the  Argentine 
Republic.  As  you  are  aware,  the  question  was  at  the  worst 
when  these  gentlemen  interposed  their  influence  for  the  opening 
up  of  the  new  channels  of  negotiation,  and  continued  using  it 
until  the  final  solution." 

2  Read  before  the  American  Greographical  Society  on  the 
evening  of  Feb.  18,  1884. 


THE  DOCTRINE  APPLIED.        121 

lead  to  the  interposition  of  the  foreign  creditors 
to  whom  those  provinces  had  been  hypothe- 
cated, and  also  that  Peru  might  seek  a  Euro- 
pean protectorate  to  save  her  from  anarchy. 
However,  none  of  the  events  consequent  upon 
the  termination  of  the  late  war  have  necessi- 
tated any  fresh  assertion  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  of  the  application  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  although  the  subject  has  given 
rise  to  much  discussion  by  the  press. 


122  THE   MONKOE   DOCTEINE. 


CHAPTER  X. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

We  present  a  summary  of  the  views  enter- 
tained both  by  the  opponents  and  the  advocates 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

r  The  arguments  in  denial  of  the  doctrine  as  a 
(y}rule  of  action  or  as  a  principle  of  international 

(law  are  briefly  these  :  — 

/It  is  claimed  that  the  doctrine  is  in  a  sense 
tfer'outgrowth  of  the  traditional  American  pol- 
icy of  non-intervention  in  European  affairs ;  but 
this  policy  has  not  always  obtained,  —  notably 
in  the  action  of  the  United  States  relative  to  the 
liberation  of  Kossuth  from  Turkish  restraint,  and 
his  removal  from  Turkish  soil  upon  a  United 
States  war  steamer  in  1851.^\ 

1  When  Kossuth  fled  to  Turkey  ii;i  1849,  his  extradition 
was  demanded  by  Austria  and  Russia;  but  on  Sept.  1,  1851, 
he  was  allowed  to  embark  on  the  United  States  war  steamer 
"  Mississippi,"  which  in  accordance  with  a  resolution  of  the  Unite^ 
States  Senate  had  been  despatched  to  carry  him  to  America  as 
the  guest  of  the  nation.  Although  he  was  received  by  both 
branches  of  the  National  Congress,  there  was  a  discussion  in 


CONCLUSIONS.  123 

i  The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  always  failed  of 
legislative  confirmation,  j  The  President  has 
no  right  to  declare  a  principle  obligatory  upon 
foreign  nations,  or  even  upon  this  country. 
This  is  not  only  the  opinion  of  Europeans,  but 
of  many  Americans,  such  as  Calhoun,  Clayton,^ 
and  Wilson,  the  last  of  whom,  in  a  speech  de- 
livered in  the  United  States  Senate  on  Feb.  12, 
1856,  declared :  — 

"  I  am  ready  here  to-day  to  vote  for  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  laid  down  and  defined  by  Mr.  Adams  in 
his  message  on  the  Panama  mission ;  but  until  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  adopt  it,  I 
think  the  less  our  statesmen  at  home  and  diploma- 
tists abroad  say  about  it,  in  dealing  with  interna- 
tional questions,  the  better."^ 

(President  Monroe  condemned  foreign  coer- 
cion ;  that  is,  the  forcible  extension  by  the  Allied 

those  bodies  —  especially  in  the  Senate  —  as  to  whether  the 
course  pursued  by  the  Government  was  or  was  not  a  departure 
from  the  policy  of  non-intervention  in  European  affairs.  (See 
Congressional  Globe,  vol.  xxiv.  part  1,  and  vol.  xxv.) 

1  See  pages  21,  56,  57.  It  is  proper  to  remark  that  for  the 
past  half-century  resolution  after  resolution  upon  the  subject  has 
been  before  both  branches  of  Congress,  only  to  be  withdrawn 
or  to  be  adversely  reported  upon  by  the  committee  to  whom 
intrusted. 

2  See  pages  72,  73. 

*  Congressional  Globe,  34th  Congress,  Ist  Session ;  Appendix, 
p.  87. 


124  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

Powers  of  despotical  institutions  to  this  hemi- 
sphere, and  not  voluntary  acceptance  of  the 
monarchical  principle.  He  had  in  view  mili- 
tary and  political,  and  not  social  and  industrial 
movements.^  Hence  all  the  arguments  in  favor 
of  the  modern  appli<i^-tion  of  the  doctrine  are 
illogical  and  untenable^ 

(The  principle  of  colonization  is  dead.  If 
the  language  of  President  Monroe  '^  expressed 
the  intention  that  the  South  American  re- 
publics should  be  prevented  from  freely  sur- 
rendering their  territory  for  the  purposes  of 
colonization,  this  was  going  altogether  too  far ; 
it  was  avowing  a  rule  of  interference  on  our 
part  equally  to  be  condemned  with  the,  similar 
one  acted  on  by  European  absolutists./  ^  Be- 
sides, Mr.  Adams,  when  President,  practically 
qualified  this  part  of  the  doctrine.^ 

Finally,  as  maintained  by  Mr.  Calhoun,  the 
declaration  refers  only  to  the  Allied  Powers, 
and  contains  no  reference  to  resistance ;  and,  so 
far  as  the  Spanish-American  republics  are  con- 
cerned, such  recommendations  as  those  of  Mr. 
Polk  upon   the  disturbance  in  Yucatan  oblige 

1  See  Catholic  World,  vol.  xxxi.  p.  133. 

2  Article  of  President  Woolsey  in  Johnson's  Cyclopaedia,  vol* 
iii.  p.  590. 

*  See  page  27. 


CONCLUSIONS.  125 

us  to  become  a  party  to  all  their  wars.^  This 
view  is  fortified  by  the  consideration  that  the 
Latin  races  have  never  been  successful  colo- 
nists. The  separation  of  the  Spanish  American 
colonies  from  the  mother  country  did  not  bring 
stability,  and  was  not  followed  by  progress. 
There  has  been  a  constant  fulfilment  of  the  pre- 
dictions of  Bolivar,  the  Liberator  of  Colombia 
and  Peru,  that  the  South  American  countries 
would  "  inevitably  fall  into  the  hands  of  the 
unbridled  rabble,  and  little  by  little  become 
a  prey  to  petty  tyrants  of  all  colors  and 
races."  ^  To  become  involved  in  their  wars  or 
disputes  is  to  expose  ourselves  to  annoyance,  if 
not  danger. 

Eesistance  to  foreign  interposition  may  some- 
times be  necessary;  but  each  case  must  be 
decided  upon  its  merit§i  This  is  the  very  far- 
thest the  Government  would  be  justified  in 
going.^ 

The  following  may  be  regarded  as  a  fair  ex- 
position of  the  arguments  of  those  who  support 
the  doctrine  :  — 

*  See  chap.  iv. 

2  Bolivar's  letter  of  Nov.  9,  1830,  to  General  Flores. 

8  See  pages  41,  42. 


126  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

The  removal  of  Kossuth  from  Turkish  soil  on 
an  American  war  vessel,  and  his  subsequent  re- 
ception by  the  United  States  Congress,  may  pos- 
sibly constitute  an  exception  to  the  cherished 
traditional  policy  of  non-intervention  in  European 
affairs;  but  the  subject  is  one  upon  which  Amer- 
ican statesmen  are  not  agreed.  It  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  by  the  adherence  to  that  policy, 
even  before  its  enunciation  by  Washington,  the 
United  States  incurred  the  displeasure  of  France, 
under  whose  direction  thousands  of  American 
ships  were  destroyed  and  their  cargoes  confis- 
cated, —  a  proceeding  which  eventually  gave 
rise  to  what  is  known  as  the  "  French  Spoliation 
Claims."  Notwithstanding  this  hardship,  the 
policy  was  never  renounced,  ^^ow  the  case  of 
Kossuth  was  peculiar  in  this :  the  United  States 
did  not  violate  the  rules  of  international  law  or 
of  international  comity,  nor  was  their  action  ^jjiided 
hy  any  obligation  to  or  with  any  foreign  Power\  On 
the  other  hand,  whenever  an  invitation  has  been 
extended  by  any  European  Government  to  that 
of  the  United  States  to  enter  into  any  arrange- 
ment relative  to  a  contemplated  movement  in 
this  hemisphere,  it  has,  with  one  exception^ 
been  declined.  The  rule  is  shown  by  the  dec- 
lination of  Mr.  Rush  for  this  Government  to 


CONCLUSIONS.  127 

participate  in  the  contemplated  European  Con- 
gress upon  Spanish- American  affairs  ;  ^  and  by 
the  refusal  of  the  Government  to  become  a 
party  both  to  the  proposed  tripartite  arrange- 
ment in  1852^  and  to  the  armed  intervention 
in  Mexico  in  1862.  The  exception  to  the  rule 
is  the  ^layton-Bulwer  treaty jj  which,  according 
to  the  principles  of  international  law,  is  void- 
able at  the  pleasure  of  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment, provided  Great  Britain  declines  to 
agree  to  the  desired  modifications.^  As  to  the 
affairs  of  these  continents,  Mr.  Adams  clearly 
shows  that  the  acceptance  by  this  Government 
of  the  invitation  to  participate  in  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  Panama  Congress  was  in  accord 
with  the  policy  of  non-intervention.* 

vf  he  declaration  that  the  principle  of  coloniza- 
tion is  dead  is  too  sweeping  and  unguarded.  It 
is  true  that  the  inhibition  of  President  Monroe 
upon  this  subject  was  called  forth  by  the  dis- 
pute over  the  territory  in  the  northwest.^  But 
the  word  "henceforth"  has  plainly  a  future  ref- 
erence ;  and  the  statement  ^  of  Mr.  Adams,  which 
is  declared  by  many  to  be  a  limitation  of  the 
Monroe    Doctrine,   as    applied    to    colonization 

1  See  page  10.  2  gee  chap.  vi. 

»  See  page  73.  •*  See  page  30. 

^  See  pages  12-16,  and  chap.  viii.         ®  See  pages  27-29. 


128  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

simply  refers  to  the  advisability  of  each  Ameri- 
can State  to  make  for  itself  the  declaration  which 
Mr.  Monroe  made  for  the  United  States  in  1823.^ 
Interference  by  France  in  the  affairs  of  Colom- 
bia ^  may  present  a  recurrence  of  the  question  at 
any  moment ;  and  the  present  restless  ambition 
of  the  French  people  for  colonial  extension 
affords  a  cause  for  apprehension. 

^he  relation  of  the  United  States  to  the 
soumern  republics  is  a  consideration  of  cardi- 
nal importance.  The  United  States  were  the 
N^  first  nation  to  recognize  their  independence^  and 
1  from  that  moment  their  resubjugationby  Spain 
became  an  impossibility.  Their  subsequent 
recognition  by  Great  Britain,  therefore,  was  of 
no  practical  advantage.  Hence  the  declara- 
tion of  Mr.  Canning  in  the  House  of  Commons 
in  December,  1826,  "I  called  the  New  World 
into  existence,  to  redress  the  balance  of  the 
Old,"^  was  nothing  but  grandiloquence.  The 
position  taken  by  the  United  States  in  relation 
to  those  republics  is  well  shown  by  their  ac- 
tion during  the  French  intervention  in  Mexico) 
The  careful  but  firm  policy  of  Mr.  Seward 
during  this  trying  period  was  supplemented  by 

1  See  page  34.  2  gee  note,  page  76. 

*  Annual  Register,  vol.  Ixviii.  p^.  204. 


CONCLUSIONS.  129 

his  frank  avowal  in  his  letter  of  June  2,  1866, 
to  Mr.  Kilpatrick,  the  American  Minister  to 
ChiH:  — 

"  We  maintain  and  insist,  with  all  the  decision  and 
energy  compatible  with  our  existing  neutrality,  that 
the  republican  system  which  is  accepted  by  the  peo- 
ple in  any  one  of  those  (that  is,  Spanish-American) 
States  shall  not  be  wantonly  assailed,  and  that  it  shall 
not  be  subverted  as  an  end  of  a  lawful  war  by  Euro- 
pean powers.  We  thus  give  to  those  republics  the 
moral  support  of  a  sincere  liberal,  and  we  think  it 
will  appear  a  useful,  friendship.  .  .  .  Those  who  think 
that  the  United  States  could  enter  as  an  ally  into 
every  war  in  which  a  friendly  republican  state  on 
this  Continent  became  involved,  forget  that  peace  is 
the  constant  interest  and  unswerving  policy  of  the 
United  States."  ^ 

The  predictions  of  Bolivar  have  never  been 
realized.  This  disappointed  patriot  failed  to 
look  into  the  future  and  behold  the  effect  of  the 
influence  of  the  United  States  upon  the  social 
and  political  condition  of  the  southern  republics, 
(fhis  influence  has  been  exerted  in  extending 
their  good  offices  to  further  the  settlement  of 
boundary  disputes  and  wars.^' 
\llte  argument  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  can 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1866,  part  ii.  p.  413. 

2  See  pages  il9  and  120,  note. 

9 


130  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

have  no  validity  because  it  has  never  received 
legislative  sanction,  carries  with  it  no  weight. 
Many  rules  of  international  law  impose  an  ob- 
ligation derived  from  usage  alone.  The  origi- 
nal declaration  of  Mr.  Monroe  is  a  precedent 
acknowledged  by  the  American  people,  and  to 
a  certain  extent  acquiesced  in  by  European 
authorities.  Hardly  a  President  since  Mr.  Mon- 
roe has  omitted  to  refer  to  it  in  language  of 
approval.  ^It  has  always  been  regarded  as  a 
question  independent  of  party  politics,  save 
perhaps  in  its  application  to  the  Congress  at 
Panama^  ?  It  has  been  persistently  asserted  by  the 
majority  oT American  statesmen;  and  to  declare 
tiiat  it  cannot  obtain  as  a  universal  obligation 
is  practically  to  throw  discredit  upon  Washing- 
ton's Farewell  Address^  whose  recommenda- 
tions, though  never  embodied  in  statutes  or 
approved  by  resolution  of  Congress,  have  fre- 
quently shaped  the  foreign  and  domestic  policy 
of  the  Governmentj 

These  positions  are  rendered  impregnable 
by  the  fact,  that  though  the  doctrine  gradually 
developed,^  it  was,  to  use  the  language  of  Mr. 
Everett, (finally  announced  by  President  Monroe, 
"  not  merely  with  the  approval  of  the  British 

1  See  chap.  i. 


CONCLUSIONS.  131 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  hvi  at  his  earnest  and 
often  repeated  solidtathns.r 

Finally,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  to  America 
what  the  Balance  of  Power  is  to  Europe.  The 
analogy  may  not  be  complete,  because  several 
nations  in  Europe  unite  to  preserve  a  ratio  of 
power,  while  on  this  hemisphere  the  influence 
of  the  United  States  is  paramount.  But  it  is 
this  feature  which  is  especially  worthy  of  note. 
When  or  where  has  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  extended  its  mediatorial  services 
to  its  sister  republics,  save  in  the  mterests  of 
peace  and  for  the  promotion  of  just  and  stable 
government  ?  It  was  the  influence  of  popular 
opinion  in  the  United  States  upon  the  people 
of  Mexico  to  which  Mr.  Seward  emphatically 
referred  in  his  communication  of  Oct.  9,  1863, 
to  Mr.  Motley,  the  American  Minister  to  Aus- 
tria. That  the  administration  believed  that 
this  popular  opinion  had  something  more  than  a 
mere  local  influence,  appears  from  the  following 
passage  from  the  same  instructions :  — 

'^  The  President,  moreover,  believes  that  this  popu- 
lar opinion  of  the  United  States  is  just  in  itself,  and 
eminently  essential  to  the  progress  of  civilization  on\ 

1  Letter  in  the  "  New  York  Ledger,"  Oct.  3, 1862.  See  also 
Sumner's  "  Prophetic  Voices,"  p.  157. 


132  THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE. 

the  American  continent ;  which  civilization  he  be- 
lieves can  and  will,  if  left  free  from  European  resist- 
ance, work  harmoniously  together  with  advancing 
refinement  on  the  other  continents.*'  ^ 

This  prediction  has  been  amply  fulfilled  in 
the  twenty  years  which  have  elapsed  since  its 
announcement ;  and  there  never  was  a  period 
when  an  adherence  to  the  principles  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  more  likely  to  be  pro- 
ductive of  beneficial  results  to  the  people  of 
both  American  continents  than  the  present. 

1  Foreign  Relations,  1863,  part  ii.  p.  936. 


VENEZUELA.  133 


CHAPTER  XI. 

(Supplementary.) 
VENEZUELA. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been,  in  recent 
years,  applied  in  the  case  of  disturbances  in. 
Venezuehi. 

1.  The  controve7'sy  as  to  teri^itorial  juris- 
diction. — For  a  long  period  before  1895  a  dif- 
ference had  existed  between  the  governments 
of  Great  Britam  and  Venezuela  as  to  the 
boundary  line  between  the  last-named  country 
and  British  Guiana. 

The  United  States  Congress,  on  Feb.  22, 
1895,  in  joint  resolution,  approved  President 
Cleveland's  suggestion  that  this  dispute  be 
referred  to  arbitration;  and  on  July  25,  1895, 
Mr.  Olney,  Secretary  of  State,  sent  a  letter  to 
the  American  ambassador  in  London,  assert- 
ing with  force  the  application  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  to  this  controversy.  "  Today,"  he 
declared,  '"the  United  States  is  practically 
sovereign  on  this  continent,  and  its  fiat  is  law 
upon  the  subjects  to  which  it  confines  its  in- 
terposition." 


134  THE    MONKOE    DOCTRINE. 

In  the  first  of  two  notes,  dated  ^ov.  26, 
1895,  Lord  Salisbury  questioned  both  the 
soundness  and  the  application  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine;  and  in  his  second  note,  of  the  same 
date,  he  stated  at  length  the  contention  of 
Great  Britain  as  to  the  disputed  territory,  and 
refused  to  submit  the  difference  to  arbitration. 

Thereupon  President  Clevehmd  submitted 
to  Congress  a  message  in  which  he  asserted 
that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  '*  has  its  place  in 
the  code  of  international  law  as  certainly  and 
as  securely  as  if  it  were  specifically  mentioned." 
He  also  suggested  that  Congress  appropriate 
money  ''  for  the  exjDcnses  of  a  commission,  to 
be  appointed  by  the  Executive,"  who  should 
make  investigation  and  report.  "  When  such 
report  is  made  and  accepted  it  will,  in  my  opin- 
ion, be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  resist 
by  every  means  in  its  power,  as  a  wilful 
aggression  upon  its  rights  and  interests,  the 
appropriation  by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands  or 
the  exercise  of  governmental  jurisdiction  over 
any  territory  which,  after  investigation,  we 
have  determined  of  right  to  belong  to  Vene- 
zuela." 

The  Commission  was  soon  after  appointed; 
but  as  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
had  agreed  to  submit  the  controversy  to  arbi- 


VENEZUELA.  135 

tration,  this  commission  eoiicludecl  to  formu- 
late no  report. 

The  arbitrators  appointed  met  in  Paris  in 
1899,  and  in  October  of  that  year  dehvered 
their  unanimous  award,  definitely  fixing  the 
boundary  line.  AYhile  this  award  was  gener- 
ally regarded  as  favorable  to  the  British  con- 
tention, the  fact  that  the  British  government 
in  agreeing  to  arbitration  practically  receded 
from  its  fii-st  position,  was  declared  by  many 
Americans  as  a  recognition  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.^ 

2.  The  attempt  by  Germany  and  England 
to  enforce  their  money  claims. 

This  recent  event  may  be  briefly  treated. 
It  is  not  contended  that  the  government  of 
y enezuela  repudiated  its  obligations ;  in  fact, 
that  government  only  objected  to  the  amount 
of  the  claims,  and  proposed  that  they  be  passed 
upon  by  a  board  of  Venezuelans,  while  the 
creditor  nations  urged  their  reference  to  a 
mixed  commission.  The  method  adopted — 
the  sinking  of  Venezuelan  war  vessels  and  the 
bombardment  of  Venezuelan  ports — is  believed 

^  An  account  of  the  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy,  the 
Commission  appointed  by  fPresident  Cleveland,  Diplomatic 
Correspondence  and  the  Arbitration  Treaty,  is  given  in  the 
Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1895,  p.  741  et  seq.  and  1896,  pp.  819-  500, 
806. 


13(5  THE    MONROE    DOCTIUNE. 

to  be  one  of  the  first  attempts  in  history  to 
enforce  commercial  demands  l)y  virtual  acts 
of  war.  It  is  to  be  noted,  howevei*,  that  both 
Great  Britain  and  (rermany  disavowed  to  the 
American  government  in  advance  any  inten- 
tion to  acquire  territory,  the  German  ambassa- 
dor assuring-  the  State  Department:  '•  We 
declare  especially  that  under  no  circumstances 
do  we  consider  in  our  proceedings  the  acqui- 
sition or  the  permanent  occupation  of  Vene- 
zuelan territory." 

The  withdrawal  of  the  German  and  British 
war  vessels  from  the  blockade  of  Venezuelan 
ports  and  the  ad()])tion  of  measures  for  the 
settlement  of  the  ditficulty  Avithout  any  dis^ 
turbance  of  the  autonomy  of  Venezuela  or 
appropriation  of  her  territory,  and  that  too 
through  the  mediation  of  Mr.  Bowen,  the 
American  representative,  have,  in  the  opinion 
of  many,  given  additional  efficacy  to  the  dec- 
laration of  President  Moiu-oe.^ 

'  An  account  of  the  revolution  in  Venezuela  and  the  question 
of  the  claims  of  foreigners  against  the  government  is  given  in 
Annual  Cyclopaedia,  1901,  p.  783  et  seq.  and  1902,  pp.  824-830. 
The  volume  for  1903,  wliich  will  soon  appear,  may  be  con- 
sulted for  the  conclusion  of  the  subject. 


INDEX, 


ADAMS,  CHARLES  FRANCIS,  ^'^^ 

remarks  of,  as  to  Monroe  Doctrine 13 

ADAMS,  JOHN  QUINCY, 

part  taken  by,  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine,         12-14,  21,  22,  40, 

41,  111,  112 

interest  of,  in  the  Panama  Congress  ...*..  23-34 
ANDERSON,  RICHARD  C, 

envoy  to  Panama  Congress 27,  32,  34 

ARTHUR,  PRESIDENT, 

views  of,  upon  Isthmian  Canal 66 

BALANCE  OF  POWER, 

what  it  is 4,  5 

BLAINE,  JAMES  G., 

communications  of,  upon  Isthmian  Canal  ....  59-66 
BOLIVAR,   SIMON, 

predictions  of 125,  129 

BRIGHT,  JOHN, 

denunciation  of  Balance  of  Power  by 5 

BROUGHAM,  HENRY, 

views  of,  upon  Monroe  Doctrine 20 

BULWER,  SIR  HENRY, 

negotiation  of  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  by 48 

BURNSIDE,  AMBROSE  E., 

resolution  of 56 

CALHOUN,  JOHN  C, 

views  of,  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine 38-42 

upon  Cuba 80,  81 


134  INDEX. 

Pages 

CANNING,  GEORGE, 

part  taken  by,  in  Monroe  Doctrine 8-11 

boast  of 128 

CASS,  GENERAL, 
views  of,  upon  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 73 

CLAY,  HENRY, 

resolution  of 21 

espousal  of  southern  republics  by 24 

interest  of,  in  Panama  Congress 25-27,  34,  35 

communications  of,  as  to  Cuba 79,  80 

CLAYTON-BULWER  TREATY 

(See  Interoceanic  Canal). 

CLAYTON,  JOHN  M., 

negotiation  of  treaty  by 48 

views  of,  upon  treaty 73 

COMMISSIONERS, 
to  South  America 35,  36 

CRAMPTON,  MR., 

communications  of,  upon  Cuba      ........      S5 

CRAPO,  WILLIAM  W., 
resolution  of 57 

CREASY,  SIR  EDWARD  S., 
views  of,  upon  French  intervention 106, 107 

CUBA, 

American  interest  in 77-81 

attack  of  Lopez  upon 81,82 

proposition  of  France  and  Great  Britain  as  to  .     .     .      82-89 
proposition  for  purchase  of,  by  United  States  .     .     .      89-91 

DANA,  R.   H.  Jr., 

opinion  of,  upon  colonization 34 

DAVIS,  HENRY  WINTER, 

views  of,  upon  American  policy 102, 103 

DAYTON,  WILLIAM  L., 

communications  of,  upon  French  intervention .     .     .98,  103 

EVERETT,  EDWARD, 
communication  of,  upon  Cuba 86-88 


INDEX.  135 

FERDINAND  DE  LESSEPS,  ^'^ 

interest  of,  in  interoceanic  canal    .     .     .    •     •     .     65, 76  n. 

FISH,  HAMILTON, 
participation  by,  in  Peace  Conference 119 

FRELINGHUYSEN,  F.  T., 
views  of,  upon  Isthmian  Canal 69-72 

GARWeLD,  PRESIDENT, 

views  of,  upon  South  American  affairs 35 

upon  Isthmian  Canal 58 

GRANVILLE,  EARL, 

communications  of,  upon  Isthmian  Canal      61,  67,  68,  71,  72 

HAYES,   PRESIDENT, 
views  of,  upon  interoceanic  canal 57,  58 

INTEROCEANIC   CANAL, 

projects  for 43 

treaty  with  New  Granada  as  to 44 

events  leading  to  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  as  to  .     .    .      44-48 

synopsis  of  that  treaty 48-51 

discussion  over 51-76 

resolutions  as  to 56,  57 

JEFFERSON,  THOMAS, 
opinion  of,  as  to  intervention    ..••••...      14 

KOSSUTH,  LOUIS, 
case  of 122,  125,  126 

LOWE,  ROBERT, 
views  of,  upon  Balance  of  Power 5 

MACKINTOSH,  SIR  JAMES, 

views  of,  upon  Monroe  Doctrine    ........      20 

MADISON,  JAMES, 

opinion  of,  as  to  intervention 14 

MALMESBURY,  EARL  OF, 

communications  of,  upon  Cuba 85 


136  INDEX. 

McDOUGALL,  ^'**' 

remarks  by,  upon  French  intervention 102 

MEXICO,  INTERVENTION  IN, 

claims  which  led  to 92-96 

agreement  of  the  Powers  as  to 96 

withdrawal  of  Spain  and  Great  Britain  from    ....       97 

attitude  of  the  United  States  as  to 98-107 

MONROE  DOCTRINE, 

what  it  is 4 

events  leading  to  publication  of 7 

first  hint  of 13 

enunciation  of 12-21 

resolutions  as  to      ....  21,  56,  57,  102,  115,  123,  note  1 

fails  of  legislative  confirmation 21 

Occasions  of  its  application, 

Panama  Congress 23-36 

Yucatan 37-42 

interoceanic  canal 43-76 

Cuba 77-91 

French  intervention  in  Mexico 92-107 

the  Northwest  and  Canada 108-115 

Texas 116, 117 

Santa  Domingo 117, 118 

war  of  Spain  with  Peru  and  Chili 118-120 

war  of  Chili  with  Peru  and  Bolivia 120, 121 

arguments  against 122-125 

in  favor  of 125-132 

MONROE,  JAMES 

(See  Monroe  Doctrine). 
MOSQUITO  INDIANS, 
differences  over 46,  47,  52-54 

NORTHWESTERN  TERRITORY, 
disputed  claims  to 12,  13,  37,  108-113 

OSTEND  MANIFESTO, 
what  it  was 89,90 


INDEX.  137 

Pages 
PANAMA  CONGRESS, 

what  it  was 25,  35 

PIERCE,  PRESIDENT, 

directions  of,  as  to  purchase  of  Cuba 89,  90 

PLUMER,  WILLIAM, 

extract  from  diary  of 21,  22 

POINSETT,  J.  R., 

resolution  of 21 

instructions  of,  from  Mr.  Clay 25 

POLK,  PRESIDENT, 

views  of,  upon  Monroe  Doctrine 37-39 

proposition  of,  as  to  Cuba 81 

RUSH,  RICHARD, 
part  taken  by,  in  Monroe  Doctrine     .    .    .    .     9, 10,  12,  14 

RUSSELL,  LORD  JOHN, 

views  of,  upon  Monroe  Doctrine 20 

communication  of,  upon  Cuba 88 

SERGEANT,  JOHN, 

envoy  to  Panama  Congress 27, 32,  34 

SEWARD,  WILLIAM  H., 

attitude  of,  as  to  French  intervention     98,  100, 101, 103-105, 

128, 129,  131 

TAYLOR,  PRESIDENT, 

appointment  of  diplomatic  agent  by 47 

TREATIES, 

Holy  Alliance 6 

Aix-la-Chapelle 6 

Troppau 6 

Verona 7 

United  States  with^  Great  Britain,  Nov.  30,  1782  ...  1 

with  New  Granada 44 

with  Great  Britain,  June  15,  1846  .     .    45, 110 

with  Mexico 45 

with  Great  Britain,  April  19, 1850  ...  48 

with  Nicaragua 54 


138  INDEX. 

Pases 
TREATIES,  —  continued. 

United  States  with  Spain 109 

with  Great  Britain,  Oct.  20, 1818   ...     109 

with  Russia 113 

Great  Britain  with  Guatemala 53 

with  Honduras 53 

with  Nicaragua 53 

with  France  and  Spain 96 

with  Spain 108 

with  Russia 113 

South  American  Republics  with  Spain 119 

treaty  of  Paris,  March,  1856 74-76 

of  Chili  with  the  Argentine  Republic     .    .     .     120  u. 
Treaties  not  ratified. 

United  States  with  Nicaragua 44,  45,  47 

with  Great  Britain,  Oct.  17,  1856    .     .      52 

with  Nicaragua 76  n. 

with  France  and  Great  Britain    .     .     83,  84 

with  Spain 91 

TRIPARTITE  ARRANGEMENT, 
text  of 83,84 

WARS, 

of  whites  and  Indians  in  Yucatan 36,  42 

of  Nicaraguans  and  Mosquito  Indians 46,  47 

of  French  and  Mexicans 97-107 

of  Spain  with  Peru  and  Chili 118-120 

of  Chili  with  Peru  and  Bolivia 120, 121 

WASHINGTON, 
views  of,  upon  intervention  in  foreign  affairs  2-4,  30, 126, 130 

WEBSTER,  DANIEL, 

approval  of  Monroe  Doctrine  by 32,  33 

views  of,  as  to  Cuba ^    .     .    .    .    .      80 

WILSON,  HENRY, 

views  of,  upon  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 74 

upon  Monroe  Doctrine 123 

Of  THt 

VNIYEHeiTY 


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